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Abstract 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFFECT AND DEFENSE IN  
CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 
By 
Kari B. Gray 
Chair: Steven Tuber, Ph.D. 
The purpose of this study is to further determine the nature of the relationship between how 
defense mechanisms affect and are affected by the ways in which feelings are modulated and 
regulated in children and adolescents. This study has been built upon an IRB-approved research 
project conducted under primary investigator Steven Tuber, Ph.D. at the Psychological Center 
and the City College of New York (From Child Assessment to Child Treatment; A Preliminary 
Investigation). The study data are pre-existing, collected from 5 – 16 year old children and 
adolescents presenting for treatment and/or assessment at the Psychological Center, a community 
clinic. This group’s age range span major developmental shifts in terms of cognitive capacity 
during childhood, which allows for an exploration of these shifts in terms of affect and defense. 
All children were consecutively selected, without any additional screening procedures, as they 
presented for psychological treatment. Demographic information including age, gender, IQ, and 
SES was collected. The current study focuses on the participants’ response to the Thematic 
Apperception Test, which was part of a short protocol. The TAT transcripts were assessed using 
both the Affect Maturity Scale (AMS), and the Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM). Defenses 
were calculated proportionally, while affect maturity was calculated as a mean within each 
record. The study supported hypotheses (i) that age is positively correlated with increasing 
maturity of defense and (ii) increasing level of affect maturity, and (iii) that defense maturity and 
affect maturity are be positively correlated. Results from correlational analyses are described, as 
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are ancillary analyses that address differences between age groups and prior studies. These 
analyses provide quantitative evidence for the relationship between the developing maturity of 
defense and affect in a clinical sample of children and adolescents.  
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Introduction 
The nature and quality of both affect maturity and defense mechanisms have been 
empirically and theoretically explored from both a psychoanalytic and developmental 
perspective (Cramer, 1987; A. Freud, 1946; Thompson, 1985), but few studies have looked at the 
possible developmental relationship between the two. Both affect maturity and defense 
configurations are essential ego functions in negotiating inner and outer realities—in other 
words, both are essential to understanding our ability and style of adapting. The developmental 
interplay between affect and defense mechanisms is an important relationship to elucidate, due to 
the centrality of both within psychological health and the development of personality throughout 
the lifespan (Cramer, 1999a; Vaillant, 1977; Vaillant, Bond, & Vaillant, 1986). Longitudinal and 
cross-sectional analyses of Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) narratives in children have found 
evidence for a developmental view of defenses (Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 2007) and affect 
(Cramer, 1987; Thompson, 1981; Thompson, 1986) based on an increasing capacity for 
cognitive complexity. Taken together, the literature suggests affect maturity is a capacity that 
shapes and is shaped by an individual’s defensive tendencies and that both are deeply influenced 
by cognitive development. 
The purpose of this study is to further determine the nature of the relationship between 
how defense mechanisms affect, and are affected by the ways in which feelings are modulated 
and regulated in children and adolescents. The TAT narratives of a clinical sample of children 
and adolescents who had presented at a community clinic for psychological treatment will be 
analyzed for this purpose. These TAT records were collected through the Child Intake Research 
Group (CIRG), an IRB-approved research project conducted under primary investigator Steven 
Tuber, Ph.D. at the Psychological Center at the City College of New York. Fifty-two children 
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aged 5 – 16 years who presented for treatment at The Psychological Center during their intake 
process were assessed. This group’s age range spans major developmental shifts in terms of 
cognitive capacity during childhood, which allows for an exploration of these shifts in terms of 
affect and defense (Cramer, 1987; Fast, Erard, Fitzpatrick, Thompson, & Young, 1985; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1969). Defense will be scored using the Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM; (Cramer, 
1991), a systematic assessment of the presence of three defenses chosen for their discrete 
cognitive-developmental aspects. Denial is considered the most “primitive” as least complex, but 
most powerful in shifting reality and emerges earliest in development. The use of projection 
marks vital cognitive developments, particularly in terms of differentiated self and other and 
internalized standards of right and wrong. Identification is the most complex of the three and 
represents important developmental tasks associated with adolescence. The systematic 
assessment allows for different aspects within each defense and assesses how each defense is 
used or which aspects of the defense are utilized. Affect maturity, or the ability to recognize and 
make sense of emotion, will be measured with the Affect Maturity Scale (AMS) (Thompson, 
1981), a measure similarly designed for the TAT. The five developmental levels of the AMS are 
not attributed to a particular emotion (e.g., anger, happiness), but instead focus uniquely upon 
how affect is cognitively organized and intensional (e.g., directed towards something/someone) 
(Brentano, 2012/1874; Thompson, 1985). Affect maturity and defense are intertwined and 
inseparable, but in order to review the literature that is central to this study, each will be 
presented individually. This decoupling of defense and affect is limited in real-life 
meaningfulness, but will allow for the most clarity in examining each domain.  
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Background and Literature Review 
Theoretical Forbearers of Defense and Affect Development 
 Sigmund Freud. Although the theories regarding the motivation and purpose of defense 
mechanisms have shifted and expanded since they were initially theorized, in every 
conceptualization they play the role of maintaining some kind of affective equilibrium, whether 
internal or interpersonal (Cooper, 1998). The concept of defense mechanisms was initially 
presented by Sigmund Freud through his studies of the origins of the neuroses (e.g., hysteria, 
phobias and obsessions) he saw in his patients. Defenses were a mental mechanism “mediating” 
unconsciously between the opposing wishes of the id and superego (1894/1962). This defensive 
mediation was observed when an “incompatibility took place in their ideational life” arising from 
impulses of biological instinct or drive (the id) that, in the context of internal social expectations 
(e.g., sexual impulses towards a parent), were deemed unacceptable and thus requiring the use of 
defense to protect conscious interactions with the unacceptable wish. His earliest conceptions 
assumed these mechanisms were pathological or the means by which pathological symptoms 
were formed, though some later writings allowed for their non-pathological use, the focus on 
these mechanisms was largely in the context of neurotic pathology and symptoms (1922/2003; S. 
Freud, 1936/1926; S. Freud, 1958).  
Anna Freud. Anna Freud, clearly identified defenses as a normal part of human 
psychology, drew attention to their individual ontological development and understood them as 
having a range of adaptive and maladaptive uses and consequences (A. Freud, 1946; A. Freud, 
1965). This perspective stemmed from her aim to understand both normalcy and pathology in 
psychological development, believing that one informed the other. She reasoned that knowing if 
a child was in or out of line with his or her peers could clarify the range of normal to abnormal 
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(A. Freud, 1965). These wide ranging observations of development led Anna Freud to feel 
defense mechanisms had a possible “chronology.” Even though the mechanisms for 
developmental shifts in defense use were unclear to her, it was clear that the same defense could 
be pathological or healthy depending on the individual’s age and environmental circumstance. 
Her theoretical interpretations of what triggered mechanisms of defense differed from her 
father’s focus on internal conflicts and fantasies, giving more credence to the need for 
individuals to manage the pressures of external reality and ego expectations. Anna Freud’s 
perspective introduces the importance of the external environment’s role in shaping an 
individual’s developing defensive style and how an assessment of this style can provide 
information about ego development. 
Ego psychology. In the 1930’s Heinz Hartmann and his contemporaries began presenting 
new ideas about the development and role of the ego within the psychic realm. In contrast to 
Sigmund Freud’s suggestion that the ego develops from the id and its conflict with the 
frustrations of reality and super ego, Hartmann presented the “undifferentiated phase,” from 
which the id and ego develop alongside one another (Hartmann, Kris & Lowenstein, 1946). This 
perspective importantly sees development as a process of “differentiation and integration”, 
meaning that certain abilities, capacities, experiences or psychic structures develop uniquely but 
are then integrated adaptively. For example, the ego has inborn capacities (e.g., “innate 
apparatus”) that unless developing in extreme instances of deprivation, later become means of 
adaptation to the external environment as autonomous ego functions, such as attention, memory 
etc. or the “cognitive processes that are the underpinnings of the development of all we hold as 
human” (Tuber, 2012). The focus on the ego’s response to reality as opposed to simply focusing 
on the battle between the id and superego ushered in what is now termed ego psychology and 
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created a platform for later theory and research on affect, defense use and development. The 
primary purpose of defenses now went beyond avoidance of internally produced anxiety of 
clashes between the id versus superego alone, as Sigmund Freud had first posited, toward being 
considered a means of adaptation to the demands of reality and the environment in order protect 
the ego from untenable and potentially fragmenting conflict (Loewenstein, 1967). 
The shift from drive theory to ego psychology provided the theoretical framework for 
psychological testing such as the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach, 1942) and the Thematic 
Apperception Test (Morgan & Murray, 1935; Murray, 1943) that explored the nature of a 
person’s ego, which in turn could illuminate defense use and affect. Unlike directly seeking the 
id and superego, which are rarely seen, the ego’s regulatory processes can be observed 
attempting to make sense of and maneuver adaptively around these unconscious processes. 
Observations of affect and defense are observations of the ego’s functioning, and in the case of 
this study, illuminate how unconscious defensive processes in children and adolescents regulate 
emotions. 
Defense Mechanisms 
Current conceptualizations of defense mechanisms. Defense mechanisms are 
unconscious processes that attempt to protect an individual’s intra and interpersonal equilibrium 
in various ways and with varying levels of success. Defenses are kept out of consciousness, for 
they seek to protect by keeping certain experiences implicit or unconsciously transformed. This 
essential aspect of what constitutes a defense mechanism, that it is operating outside of 
consciousness, is also what makes defenses so difficult to study and has inspired many differing 
interpretations.  
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The precise thoughts, affects and internal or external stimuli that trigger defenses are not 
easily observed, measured or agreed upon: these vary greatly depending on the theoretical 
perspective of the writer. For example, defense or defense organization works in the service of 
any number of motivations: avoidance of internal/external conflict; maintaining a coherent, 
integrated sense of self; protecting self-esteem; safeguarding an important relationship and/or 
removing overwhelming affects like anxiety and shame that threaten any of the aforementioned. 
How these childhood defenses develop, operate, or are named, as well as the identification of 
their use, their effectiveness and where they stand in regard to normalcy and pathology also vary 
greatly depending on the theoretical understanding underlying the formulation: they depend on 
age (Cramer, 1987; A. Freud, 1946; A. Freud, 1965), capacity for cognitive complexity 
(Chandler, Paget, & Koch, 1978), overall ego development (Cramer, 1999a; Loewenstein, 1967), 
temperament (Shaw, Ryst, & Steiner, 1996), current and past stressors, situations, trauma 
(Cramer & Gaul, 1988; Sandstrom & Cramer, 2003; Silverman, 1999) and early relationships 
(Laor, Wolmer, & Cohen, 2001; Poikolainen, Kanerva, & Lönnqvist, 1995). 
The literature that relates to childhood and adolescent defense mechanisms is relatively 
small and even more limited when it comes to the development of defenses before adulthood. 
With the exception of a handful of researchers who have directly studied the development of 
defense mechanisms in children (e.g., Phoebe Cramer), relevant research to the development of 
childhood defense mechanisms often requires shifting findings about adults into the wider 
developmental frame of defenses throughout the lifespan, including childhood. For example, 
there is widespread agreement and reference to maladaptive adult defenses as being “primitive” 
or “immature” which suggests a theoretical development of defenses and defenses that are 
specific to childhood. Another example is in the tendency for primitive defenses to be described 
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as involving manipulating the boundary between the self and the external environment (e.g., 
denial) and this differentiation between the self, the environment and other as a major aspect and 
goal in descriptions of childhood development (e.g., Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). Despite 
the developmental path of defenses or their influence upon development being most often seen in 
longitudinal assessments of adult psychosocial adjustment, this research can provide important 
contexts for the importance of childhood defense development and the assessment, study and 
understanding of defensive phenomena. 
Defense development across the lifespan. One of the most prolific researchers in 
defensive phenomena is George Vaillant, who has dedicated himself to long-term longitudinal 
research of adult personality development and adjustment. To Vaillant, defenses are 
unconscious, conflict driven attempts of the ego to deny or alter awareness of affects, ideas, the 
self and others (1995). These defensive processes—18 in all—are arranged in a hierarchy using 
the categories of psychotic, immature, neurotic (intermediate) and mature and are synonymous 
with the developmental continuum of defenses from childhood to adulthood (Vaillant, 1992; 
Vaillant, 1995; Vaillant et al., 1986). His interest in defense use stemmed from repeated 
longitudinal evidence for the significant positive relationship between adult maturity of defenses 
and positive aspects of adult psychosocial health like the capacity to work and love (Vaillant, 
1992; Vaillant et al., 1986).  
While seeking empirical evidence that defenses were in fact an adaptive process, rather 
than a pathological mechanism, Vaillant came upon an unexpected yet important finding 
regarding childhood environment: the level of defense maturity was most predictive of adult 
mental health in the context of more difficult childhood circumstances (Vaillant et al., 1986). 
The sample he assessed at age 47 for defense maturity and general mental health had also been 
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assessed while in junior high for “familial strengths”, labeling their family environment as 
“bleak”, “intermediate” or “warm” through the combination of three subscales. Assessed through 
interviews with both parents, the child, the child’s teacher and social service records this measure 
hoped to look at “nurture” with less influence of “nature”. The first two scales assessed the 
child’s maternal relationship and paternal relationship for warmth, nurturance and 
encouragement of both autonomy and self-esteem. The third scale measured general home 
atmosphere, particularly the ability to achieve harmony in the context of difficulties. The 
relationship of adult defense maturity and positive psychosocial health was weaker in adults who 
came from “warm” childhood environments, yet for those from “bleak” childhoods defense 
maturity was the strongest factor in positive adult psychosocial health (Vaillant et al., 1986).  
First, this finding suggests that mature defense use is less likely a byproduct of overall 
positive mental heath, but rather plays an active role in achieving psychosocial health. Second, it 
suggests that defenses play a more influential role when an individual’s early primary 
relationships are either tumultuous or lacking—furthering the importance of attending to the 
development of these defenses in childhood and to the lasting influence of childhood caregiver 
relationships. Lastly, those who emerge from a childhood where one is not adequately and 
individually loved, cared for or encouraged, are more likely to do so with a weaker more 
vulnerable sense of self and self-esteem and will require developing the best defenses to survive 
and flourish, whereas those who do not find adaptive defenses, are left ill prepared and 
vulnerable. This study provides clues to how childhood environment can influence the 
importance of defense development in adulthood, or arguably, mitigating the influence of 
stressful childhoods requires a more adaptive set of defenses, even in adulthood. Further, the 
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disparity in the influence of adult defensive maturity upon psychosocial health suggested a 
causal relationship between mature defense use and positive adult psychological health. 
Defense Development in Children: Maturing Mental Capacities 
Children’s Understanding of Defenses. Many theories and interpretations of adult 
defense use assumed a developmental continuum of defenses implicitly through descriptions of 
maladaptive adult defenses as “primitive” or “immature” long before researchers had provided 
empirical evidence of this developmental continuum’s existence. Oddly enough, a developmental 
sequence for children’s ability to understand a defense was established first. Martin Whiteman 
explored children’s understanding of “psychological causality” or their ability to identify other’s 
motivations and intentions as causes of behavior. One study explored this through understanding 
and explanation of stories involving children using defenses such as denial, repression, 
regression, wishful thinking and projection (1967).  Whiteman found that children’s 
understanding of defense mechanisms grew with age and that there was a significant shift in 
understanding for preoperational 5 and 6 year old children versus concrete operational 8 and 9 
year olds: denial was understood by all but the youngest children whereas the ability to 
understand projection differentiated all but the oldest children (Whiteman, 1967; Whiteman, 
1970). This research also found that preoperational children rarely had the ability to attribute, 
connect and identify thoughts, feelings and behavior, whereas the operational age group was able 
to decode defenses. 
In the same vein of children’s understanding of defense, Chandler, Koch and Paget 
looked at the Piagetian stages of cognitive development as a theoretical predictor of the child’s 
understanding of defense mechanisms (Chandler et al., 1978; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). Using 
the language of structural analysis, these authors conceived of “affective interchanges”, which 
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are combinations of the author/subject, his or her impulse/affect and the object that is the target. 
In this language, a defense occurs when this subject-affect-object (S-A-O) is felt to be 
unacceptable and must be partially or wholly transformed. They then hypothesized that 
understanding defenses requires certain cognitive operations that are associated with 
developmental shifts: simple defenses like denial and repression are “inversions” that act by 
deleting the offending aspect; “reciprocals” are slightly more complex defenses that instead 
neutralize the unacceptable, such as rationalization, reaction formation, turning against the self 
and displacement; while most complex defenses, like projection and introjection involve 
negations, inversions and reciprocals.  
The study grouped children by their previously assessed Piagetian stage of cognitive 
development rather than age, but both age and cognitive stage ultimately predicted the amount of 
correct responses to defense understanding. The preoperational group, who’s average age was 
6.3 years and ranged from 5.3 to 9 years, correctly identified only 10% of inversion defenses 
(denial and repression), 5% of reciprocal defenses (rationalization, reaction formation, turning 
against the self and displacement) and 0% of the most complex defenses (introjection and 
projection). As with Whiteman, these numbers shift hugely for the concrete operational group, 
who’s average age was 9.7 years, ranging form 8.7 to 11 years. This group correctly identified 
75% of denial and repression use, 48% of reciprocals and 25% of projection and introjection. 
The formal operations group, with an average age of 11.4 years and a range from 9.5 to 12.3 
years, performed similarly on denial, repression and identification (80%), but were able to 
understand 70% of reciprocals and 60% of projection and introjection use.  
The general age trends seen in Whiteman (1967) and Chandler et al (1978) for defense 
understanding were also seen in a study by Dollinger and McGuire (1981) on the development of 
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psychological mindedness in children. The study had less clarity regarding the reasoning for age 
groupings and differed slightly in terms of defenses chosen for identification. However, beyond 
showing that there was increasing understanding for defense use with age, particularly for denial, 
Dollinger and McGuire discussed the ratings of the characters’ goodness-badness, dumbness-
smartness, sadness-happiness and likability given by the children. Not surprisingly, the story 
characters were rated as “less smart” and “less likable” when a child had been able to identify the 
defense used in a particular story. This changing defense awareness and shift in opinion of the 
characters’ draws attention to a central aspect of the effectiveness of defenses—that they are 
unconscious. For a young child who is using denial, to identify denial in a story would suggest 
awareness of the fallibility of their own unconscious adaptation, making it an ineffective defense. 
These studies support the idea that defenses are continually used and “demystified” during 
development, in other words, once defenses become consciously understood, they lose their 
effectiveness and motivation for use (Chandler et al., 1978; Cramer, 1983). 
The developmental course of defenses. Working from these earlier studies, Phoebe 
Cramer began her own work to bridge the gap between theories of defense development in 
children and systematic empirical study of the actual development and use of these defenses. 
Cramer states that there are two important tenets of defense mechanism development in children 
and across the lifespan (Cramer, 1991; Cramer, 2006). The first is that certain defenses appear, 
dominate and decline during particular times in development and the timing of these defenses’ 
emergence and predominance is related to the child’s expanding level of cognitive ability 
(Chandler et al., 1978; Cramer, 1983; Cramer, 1987). Within this frame, various judgments of 
the maturity or relative immaturity of a defense and its effectiveness or ineffectiveness 
(Loewenstein, 1967) are dependent on the developmental age of the individual. This has major 
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implications for assessment of normalcy and pathology. Second, as suggested by Anna Freud 
(1965), each defense has its own developmental history. Early beginnings of defense 
mechanisms have been theorized to start with a motor reflex during infancy, or a “biologically 
given defensive reflex”, which then becomes internalized as a “mental mechanism” with 
advancing development (Mahler et al., 1975; Spitz, 1961). This process results in an internalized 
ideational representation of conscious, voluntary and controlled action, which are the 
psychological beginnings of defense mechanisms.  
The Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM). In 1987, Cramer presented empirical 
evidence of a developmental course in children’s use of three defenses: denial, projection and 
identification. This study provided the groundwork for Cramer’s Defense Mechanism Manual 
(1991), which specified her method of identifying and measuring defense use. The three defenses 
of denial, projection and identification were chosen for this study—described in greater detail 
below—due to each being considered relatively mutually exclusive from one another and 
representative of increasing cognitive abilities. Unlike previous studies (i.e., Cramer, 1983) that 
looked at defenses through short stories of conflict situations and the child’s answers to questions 
such as, “what would you do?” or “what happened?” Cramer looked at defense use in 4 differing 
age groups of children through their narratives from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). 
Cramer found that denial was used more often in the youngest group (mean age = 5 years 8 
months) than in all other groups and use of denial lessened with increasing age (1987). Cramer 
also found use of projection reached its peak in the intermediate group (mean age = 9 years 10 
months) and early adolescent group (mean age = 14 years 6 months). Lastly, use of identification 
had the lowest frequency in the youngest group and the highest in the late adolescent group 
(mean age = 16 years).  
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Denial. Denial holds the theoretical status of among the most “primitive” or one of the 
earliest available defenses. Denial requires the withdrawal of attention from stimuli that is 
believed to be psychologically harmful and most strongly works to avoid external reality. Early 
versions of denial can be seen in infants who turn away from upsetting or over stimulating 
experiences (Tuber, 2012), whereupon a child may “not see” what exists in reality (i.e., 
perceptual denial) or tell an improbably happy ending to their story that had begun to spin into 
darker themes (i.e., imposition of personal fantasy). Previous research has found use of denial is 
more common in younger, preschool children (Brody, Rozek, & Muten, 1985) and associated 
with psychological difficulties when used in adulthood (Cramer, 1999b; Cramer & Tracy, 2005; 
Cramer, 2011).  
Projection. Projection requires an additional level of cognitive complexity: rough 
differentiation between inner/outer stimuli, a rudimentary sense of the self and other and an 
internalized sense of what thoughts and feelings are not acceptable (e.g., right-wrong; good-bad) 
(A. Freud, 1946; S. Freud, 1894/1962). With these developments in differentiation, splitting off 
the unacceptable inner thought/feeling and locating or attributing it outside the self becomes 
possible (Klein, 1946). From another perspective, the child who uses projection is now able to 
imagine another person’s mind and emotions, albeit with an idiosyncratic viewpoint.  
Identification. Identification is the most complex of the three. Beyond the differentiation 
between self and other required of projection, identification requires one to have solid, 
reasonably stable representations of others in order to take on their qualities. This taking on of 
other individual’s qualities most often serves the purpose of maintaining and developing self-
esteem and important relationships with others (Cramer, 2006). Early beginnings of 
identification can be seen in infants imitative behavior with their caregivers, the development of 
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the superego in toddlerhood/preschool age and then the later adolescent identification, which is 
experimentation in seeking their identity/ego ideal (Cramer, 2006) 
The developmental shifts in defense use between these three defenses during the course 
of childhood and adolescence has been supported in subsequent cross-sectional studies (Cramer 
& Gaul, 1988; Dollinger & Cramer, 1990; Porcerelli, Thomas, Hibbard, & Cogan, 1998; 
Tallandini & Caudek, 2010) and longitudinal studies (Cramer, 1997; Cramer, 2008; Cramer, 
2007; Diehl, Coyle, & Labouvie-Vief, 1996). Summarizing her findings and those from other 
researchers, Cramer (1996) states that denial dominates early childhood, but trends downward in 
use by ages 7 and 8. In the range of about 7-8 years old, childhood defense use sees the most 
significant shift, with projection used as often as denial, which has declined significantly. 
Projection use continues increasing and often dominates defense use throughout latency (ages 8-
11) and early adolescence (roughly, 12-14 years), while denial use continues to decrease. The 
use of identification begins after early childhood, but does not dominate until late adolescence 
(roughly 16 years and older). It is of note that there is a rough relationship between the 
previously mentioned ages at which the ability to recognize defense use increases and the ages 
where these defenses are no longer dominating, which again points to the essential power of 
defenses as unconscious to the user. According to Cramer, denial dominates in use before age 7 
generally and marks a stark drop off in denial use, which fits well with findings from 
Whiteman(1967) and Chandler et al (1978) showing that denial is rarely recognized by 5 and 6 
year olds until a huge shift in recognition around age 7-8. A similar pattern can be seen for 
projection recognition, increasing more gradually after 10, but not recognized by more than half 
of children until after age 12.  
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IQ, Race/Ethnicity & Socioeconomic Status. There are mixed findings regarding the 
relationship of childhood defense development and various factors of social location such as 
intelligence quotient (IQ), gender and socioeconomic status (SES) and nearly no literature, 
theoretical or empirical, regarding the influence of race and ethnicity. IQ is understood as a type 
of measure of intelligence, usually calculated through comparing an individual’s performance on 
standardized assessments to those of similar age. Although some studies have found no 
significant relationship between defense development, IQ and childhood socioeconomic status 
(SES) (Cramer & Brilliant, 2001; Vaillant & Vaillant, 1992), a more recent study questioned 
their role in the dampened use of identification in a community sample of older adolescents and 
adults when compared to previous samples taken from more highly educated and affluent 
enclaves (Cramer, 2007). One possibility is that, as seen with age, increasing cognitive abilities 
and adaptive defense use, there is a certain adaptive “fit” between defense use and IQ. Evidence 
for this possibility is seen in the use of more “primitive” or cognitively simple defenses, like 
denial, predicting higher ego levels in adults with lower IQ, while the opposite is true for high IQ 
individuals. Though this finding is of limited consequence during childhood, it can be see as 
further evidence of the central influence of cognitive ability and adaptive defense use (Cramer, 
1999a).  
The relationship between IQ, SES and defense use was explored with longitudinal data 
that looked at these variables in the context of defense development style from pre-adolescence 
to early adulthood (Cramer, 2009a). As predicted from previous cross-sectional studies, SES and 
IQ predicted change in adulthood denial use: while the use of identification and projection rose 
regardless of IQ/SES during latency and adolescence, childhood IQ/SES predicted which adults 
would continue to use identification or decline in identification use in favor of denial. Adult use 
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of projection and identification could not be predicted from childhood SES or childhood IQ, but 
there was a strong relationship between adult SES and adult IQ. Ultimately, Cramer postulated 
that perhaps those from lower SES backgrounds experienced more stress during the appropriate 
developmental period for childhood defenses, particularly denial, and their relative overuse at 
that time encouraged the carrying of childhood defenses into early adulthood (2009a). 
Poikolainen, Kanerva and Lonnqvist had similar findings in a cross-sectional study of defense 
use in adolescents (i.e., lower SES was significantly associated with increases in lowered 
maturity of defense use), but had an alternate theory that SES changed one’s sense of how much 
control, or lack thereof, one has over a potential threat, which would also influence the need for 
defenses that distort reality such as denial (1995).  
Unlike more current conceptualizations of gender as a spectrum, all the studies that 
examine gender and defense use assumed that gender and biological sex are synonymous and 
binary. Within the review literature, participants are understood as male or female only. With 
that caveat in mind, gender differences are often cited within the literature on childhood defense 
use, however, a review of child and adolescent defense studies that included males and females 
show the data do not support the extrapolated strength, generalizability and importance of gender 
differences that are presented in some discussions. There are a few exceptions (Diehl et al., 
1996), but nearly all of the data show chronological age, degree of stress and cognitive maturity 
as the primary indicators of defense use and style, whereas the data that show gender differences 
are inconsistent in their findings (Cramer, 1983; Cramer, 1987; Cramer & Gaul, 1988; Cramer & 
Block, 1998). There are studies that suggest different rates of defense development in childhood 
by gender, but the differences are most commonly observed in preschool aged children (Cramer, 
1987). The differing gender pathways of defense development are not clearly seen until 
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adulthood, though this could be a matter of limited research looking specifically at gender 
(Cramer & Tracy, 2005). 
Defense Development in Childhood: Stress, Trauma & Psychopathology 
While children will utilize the best defense available to them in any given moment, the 
amount and type of defenses used in childhood is dependent on a number of factors. As 
previously discussed, the child’s level of cognitive development is central to defense use—
developmentally younger children will not be able to effectively use or access higher level 
defenses such as identification, making denial a much more effective option due to its simplicity 
(Cramer, 2006). However, the primary purpose of defense mechanisms, both in childhood and 
adulthood, is to moderate the threatening emotional influence of conflicts, stressors and trauma 
through transforming internal thoughts and feelings and even the perception of outer realities. 
Therefore, it would be expected that childhood defense use is influenced by stress levels. For 
example, when experiencing moments of increased stress (e.g., situations that the child feels they 
cannot control, threats to self-esteem, disappointment) defense use would be expected to 
increase. There is also the question of how defense use and development is influenced by the 
length of time and level of stress experienced, along with the type of stress that is experienced 
and the actual effectiveness of the defense (i.e., the defenses’ ability to minimize psychological 
disequilibrium). These stress inducing environmental factors and the possible patterns in 
response are most essential to understanding defense use in childhood and the possible variables 
motivating or stunting development.  
Defense use in experimentally provoked stress. Cramer and Gaul created an 
experiment to look at how an experience of failure might influence defense use in 2nd and 6th 
grade boys and girls (1988). They sought to test two theoretical assumptions: first, that 
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experiencing failure would lead to increased stress and increased defense use in all children, and 
second, that children’s post-failure defenses would be developmentally regressed, while 
children’s post-success defenses would be enhanced (i.e., developmentally appropriate/mature). 
Children were matched for similar defense use in TAT stories taken 2 weeks before the 
experiment and randomly assigned for the failure or success conditions. During the experiment, 
all participants were informed of their success or failure and the success group were given an 
award that displayed their names on an “honor board” to increase the intensity experienced by 
success and failure1.  
Results in this study supported the finding that increased stress likely leads to increased 
defense use in children, seen in reports of stress and significantly higher defense use of children 
who experienced the failure condition. However, the second assumption, of defense regression-
enhancement, was not clearly supported, due to insignificant findings between grade level, 
success/failure grouping and pre/post defense use. Additional analysis provided some evidence 
of age differences in the influence of success or failure on defense use: 6th graders in the success 
group used projection and denial less than in their pretest measures, whereas 2nd graders in the 
failure group used more denial (Cramer, 2006). This was interpreted to mean that depending on 
age, negative experiences result in increased lower level defense use and that positive 
experiences support mature defense use. These findings are not strongly supported, as they are 
from post-hoc analyses alone. It also seems possible that success encourages more age 
appropriate defense use in older children.  
Sandstrom and Cramer (2003) looked at the level of stress and use of defense 
mechanisms before and after an experience of peer rejection in girls who had been grouped by 
their peers’ ratings of social status (i.e., “accepted” or popular and average; “poorly accepted” or 																																																								
1 All children in failure group experienced successful trials afterwards.  
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neglected and rejected). Levels of pre-rejection stress and defense use did not differ between 
groups. Heightened stress from pre to post rejection was significant for all groups, yet there was 
significantly more stress in the “poorly accepted” group in comparison to the “accepted” group 
post-rejection. In addition, the “poorly accepted” girls used significantly more defenses than the 
“accepted” girls post-rejection. Stress post-rejection was found to be a significant mediator of the 
relationship between social status and level of defense use in the “poorly accepted group”, rather, 
the lower the social status the higher the stress reaction to rejection, and the higher the stress 
reaction the higher the defense use. Stress was a non-significant mediator for defense use in the 
“accepted group”. While this could suggest dispositional differences in the groups, it strongly 
suggests that the higher level of defense use was due to heightened negative emotional response 
to peer-rejection for the girls who were likely familiar with experiencing peer-rejection.  
Both studies of experimentally induced stress suggest that increased stress, particularly 
stress related to being socially ostracized (e.g., not having your name on the “honor board” or 
being “poorly accepted”) will often result in increased defense use. Further, Cramer and 
Sandstrom’s study suggest that a history of positive peer-interactions is protective for stress 
levels and subsequent defense use in reaction to a singular negative peer interactions (Cramer, 
2006; 2003), whereas a history of negative peer-interactions makes a momentary rejection all the 
more painful and stress inducing, requiring more defense use.  
Defense use in naturalistic studies of stress. Dollinger and Cramer performed a study of 
defense use and emotional upset in boys aged 10-13 years who had experienced a shared 
traumatic event: a lightning strike had killed one child and injured several others during their 
soccer match (1990). In this group, defense use was significantly and negatively correlated with 
level of observed emotional upset (i.e., the more defense use, the less emotional upset). 
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However, as defense use increased, so did the disparity in emotional upset reports between 
children and their parents, suggesting a key difference in awareness of upset. Most interestingly, 
when the type of defenses used in the more highly defended group were analyzed, it became 
clear that emotional distress was further reduced when this increased defense use was with age-
appropriate defenses, such as projection. This suggests that beyond defense use increasing with 
stress, these increased defenses are most effective when age appropriate.  
Some have theorized that stressors can potentially cause regression in defense use 
(Cramer & Gaul, 1988), a study by Silverman (as cited in Cramer, 2006) used the DMM to 
assess defense use in children (aged 9-18 years) who had a younger HIV positive sibling, and for 
the majority of participants, also had a deceased parent due to HIV. This type of stress is unique 
in containing a significant stressful event with the loss of a caregiver along with the daily worries 
and vague threat related to having an HIV positive sibling. In comparison to “normal” childhood 
measures of defense use (Cramer, 1987), these children used denial at a doubled rate, but 
experienced somatic, anxious and depressed symptoms at a normal or even below normal rate. It 
seems likely, due to the self-report style of symptom measurement, that these children are 
protectively barred from recognizing their traumatic experiences through a heavier use of denial.  
When significant stress and trauma are introduced through the relationship between 
children and their caregivers, many aspects of development are negatively influenced. The 
development of defenses during childhood is particularly sensitive to this type of stress: 
 
“The younger we are, the more heavily we depend on others to contain us, to provide a 
stimulus barrier that prevents us from feeling overwhelmed by our inner sensations. This 
barrier must also protect us from external intrusions when we are too young to adequately 
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keep them at bay. Thus the burden of defenses in our earliest life depends more upon our 
caretakers.” (Tuber, 2012, p. 37-38) 
 
The importance of accessing caregiving is so paramount that even when caregiving is 
problematic, children are strongly motivated to maintain these relationships, regardless of the 
cost to their own development. In coping with a warped environment, a child’s adaptation will 
often be similarly warped at the cost of healthy socialization, reality testing, impulse control and 
overall (ego) development. A comparison of defense mechanism use in a sample of an Israeli 
children (ages 6-12; mean = 9.77 years) who were physically abused, neglected or neither 
abused/neglected by their caretakers found significant differences in maturity of defense use, 
affect, impulse control and reality testing (Finzi, Har-Even, & Weizman, 2003). Immature 
defense use dominated the defenses used by physically abused children and was significantly 
higher when compared to neglected children and children who were neither neglected nor 
abused. Similarly, neglected children also used immature defenses at a higher rate than non-
abused/neglected children (Finzi et al., 2003). These children who were physically abused also 
showed significantly more issues with regulating negative affect, impaired reality testing and 
lower impulse control. The authors concluded that parental violence was likely a harmful 
influence on the child’s developing ego functions—including defenses and the ability to use age-
appropriate defenses.    
 The age at which a disturbance in caregiving occurs is also a factor in how defenses 
develop. A 5-year follow-up longitudinal study of defense use in Israeli mother-child dyads that 
had experienced a missile attack, found that the caregiver’s initial reaction and level of 
psychological symptoms was representative of their child’s adjustment 5 years later (Laor et al., 
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2001). For mothers who had higher amounts of psychological symptoms post attack, the strength 
of this influence was dependent on the age of the child during the attack. Children who were 
younger (3-5 years) were significantly more likely to have problematic symptoms and relatively 
primitive defense use five years later, whereas this relationship was much weaker in children 
who had been older (9-11 years) during the attack. This suggests the role of the caregiver not 
only as a potential model of good psychological adjustment and defense use, but also the role of 
acting as a defensive buffer when children are younger and have fewer defenses at their disposal. 
Lastly, this study shows that trauma can influence the development of defenses. 
 The use of defenses in childhood is dependent on a variety of factors, including family 
environment and trauma history, the current context of emotional strength and the presence of 
conflict, but is primarily best understood as the child’s attempt to maintain psychological 
equilibrium with the best available defense in terms of cognitive development and the level of 
stress. With this in mind, I will now turn to the relevant literature on affect in childhood. 
Affect Maturity 
The theory and research on emotion and its development is often problematic.  Subjective 
experiences of emotion, attempts to define emotions, or focus on particular emotional states can 
be valuable, but often idiosyncratic or similarly difficult to generalize. Classic psychoanalytic 
and Piagetian (e.g., S. Freud, 1936/1926; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) views of emotion see affect as 
vital, but simply as an energy source for cognition or “ideas”, with no content, intentions or aims 
of their own (Thompson, 1985). Though recent literature on affect and emotion has been 
dominated by the model and language of emotion regulation, the following section will address 
the cognitive organization of affect and affect maturity.  
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Theoretical background of affect maturity. Anne Thompson’s model of affect maturity 
is based on her  “cognitive-intensional-constructivist” view of emotion, which in turn, is deeply 
influenced by psychoanalytic, Piagetian and cognitive developmental theory. Emotion is more 
than the fuel for Piaget’s cognition or Freud’s “ideas”—it has its own cognitive structure and 
related motivations (Thompson, 1985, p.152). Seeing emotions as at least partially comprised of 
cognitive structures, both conscious and unconscious, makes space for their intensional quality. 
By intensional, Thompson explains affects are, “‘of’ something”, and are “‘directed’ to objects” 
(1985, p. 152) —in other words, affects are most often goal-directed at someone or something, 
including the self. Emotions are “constructivist” because they develop in reaction to the 
environment that they are directed toward, rather than being inborn. Due to its intensional 
quality, affect development occurs in repeated interactions with the environment/other. These 
repeated interactions with the environment are the impetus for affect development in cognition 
and self-other differentiation.  
Systems theory provides a complimentary way of thinking about how the essential 
elements of affect interact and mature (Thompson, 1985). In an organizational or systems view 
of developmental psychology, differentiation of any capacity or response provides an 
opportunity for further integration or organization into a variety of systems. With further 
differentiation and integration, the elements of affect, such as representations of self-other, 
cognition, action, somatic sensations and expression become more and more hierarchically 
organized within a system (Thompson, 1981). How and at what level affect has been 
differentiated and integrated will influence the experience and expression of that emotion. 
The concept of differentiation and integration is central to the concept of the nature of 
emotions and affect maturity. As a student of Irene Fast, Thompson was deeply influenced by 
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Fast’s “Event Theory”, which itself was inspired by an integration of Piagetian and Freudian 
concepts (Fast et al., 1985). In this theory an “event” is any interaction (“action”) between the 
self and non-self, which at early developmental stages includes animate and inanimate objects. 
Over time, these events, or “actions” with the environment allow for differentiation and 
integration, leading to psychological development.  
 Donald Winnicott’s (1945; 1965) ideas about early development  parallel both Fast and 
Thompson, providing support and theoretical nuance for psychological development through 
differentiation and integration. Winnicott felt that for the infant, experiencing the world as safe, 
continuous and predictable, in other words, being reliably taken care of, was essential in early 
development. At first, this learning comes from the “good enough” mother who is able to 
provide consistent care through responding to the infant’s active wish within a time frame and in 
a manner that makes the infant feel that he has magically “created” this response (Winnicott, 
1945). Once the infant can take this care for granted, the coherent if not omnipotent illusion of 
the now reliable mother he created allows him to take in future “misses” on the mother’s part 
because she has been internalized, not as a traumatizing deprivation, but instead as the important 
beginnings of “not-me” and objective thinking (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:141; 
Winnicott, 1945). The beginnings of “not-me” are the beginnings of early differentiation 
between objective and subjective described by Fast and Thompson. When the mother is “not 
good enough” she cannot provide a healthy ratio of responsiveness and misattuned moments to 
facilitate the infant’s understanding of the difference between subjective and objective. The 
subjective (e.g., omnipotent fantasy) and objective (e.g., mother is busy now) become unclear or 
inconsistent to the infant. Without continued support of the infant’s omnipotence in the external 
world via the mother’s “good enough” provisions, the spontaneous gestures that are the 
 	
25 
precursors of aliveness, creativity and authenticity can wither, making such representations of the 
True Self muted. Winnicott felt that these early experiences were the foundation of later 
developments, including defensive organization and tolerance of difficult affects. 
 Development of Affect Maturity. Though Thompson stresses the continuous nature of 
affect development and the ability to regress under trauma and stress, it is helpful for the 
purposes of this review to make some generalizations that characterize affect in various age 
ranges. Additionally, the use of Piagetian developmental phases, also used by Thompson, and 
similarly utilizing age determined levels or phases, will help illuminate and clarify the phases or 
levels of affect development.  Anna Freud’s concept of “developmental lines” (A. Freud, 1965, 
p. 245) has a number of key aspects that inform the development and observation of affect 
maturity as described by Thompson. The concept of developmental lines represents how 
maturational/biological, psychic and environmental aspects interact like so many intersecting 
threads that make (or break) the developmental pattern, as is the case with affect maturity (A. 
Freud, 1965; Thompson, 1985; Thompson, 1986).This can be seen in Thompson’s Affect 
Maturity Scale (AMS), which attempts to represent the changing developmental patterns of 
affect during different levels of differentiation of self, environment and other, temporal reality, 
amount of agency felt towards an emotion, ability to attribute emotion to others and the self. 
These aspects are expanded on in the 5 levels of affect maturity as understood through the Affect 
Maturity Scale. 
Affect Maturity Scale 
Level One. Primitive affect is powerful and holds sway in a globalized manner—as it 
shifts, so do cognitive representations of the self, other, environment and reality. Borrowing from 
Werner (1948) and Fast et al (1985), Thompson aptly names this type of primitive emotion as the 
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“affect-event” (1986, p. 210).  The affect-event is undifferentiated and unsystematized 
hierarchically—for the differentiation of self and other has not yet developed. Emotions are 
entirely event-like, “atmospheric”, an emotion is belonging to no one and everything, swathing 
everything in the same color, a person is “in” the emotion, but can just as easily move to being 
“in” another emotion—it is ephemeral and unrelated to the individual’s history (Thompson, 
1986, p. 214). Without differentiation, affects, self, other, environment etc. are all one and the 
same. There is no temporal reality as the primitive cognitive systems of affect lack connection to 
one another and snap rigidly in and out of awareness, one at a time. An alternate affect cannot be 
held in mind during an affect event, bringing the sense that nothing can change the affect, it is 
forever, yet this forever affect never happened as the disappearance of one affect occurs and 
when another comes into dominance(Thompson, 1986, p. 209). Actions are not separate from 
emotion; actions are involuntary, imposed by the event. There is no sense of agency, it is “just 
happening”, the affect-event is attributed to the self, other, bodily sensations, external 
environment etc. and only regrettable as an uncontrollable weather event. Therefore, at the most 
primitive, affects are not expressed or described directly, they are most likely described and 
expressed in terms of action and bodily sensations. 
The primitive affect thus described is representative of affect in the sensorimotor periods, 
generally ranging from birth to 2 years. In this framework, it would make sense that event-like 
affect is experienced, due to the phase culminating in achievement of object permanence through 
sensorimotor interactions (e.g., touching, hearing, grasping, sucking and so on). Through these 
experiences, differentiation between the self and the environment, along with the awareness that 
these things exist outside of the immediate sensorimotor experience, are developed (Thompson, 
1986, p. 210). However, Mahler, Pine and Bergman point out that obtaining object constancy is a 
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more complex notion that involves more than the “inanimate, transiently cathected, physical 
objects” of Piaget’s object permanence (1975, p. 111). Object constancy involves the more 
complex internalization of the caregiver, who once internalized, remains constant and soothing in 
the physical absence of that caregiver. Thompson appears to agree, for she clarifies the self-other 
differentiation of this phase:  “Although there may be differentiation within the affective event, 
the object is not differentiated from the affective event.” (Thompson, 1985).  
Level Two. Event-like affects continue within the next level with the preoperational 
child’s level of cognitive development (2-6 years) when the hallmark cognitive processes of this 
stage are considered. First, sensorimotor operations still carry weight, but there is also 
egocentrism, or the inability to understand or conceive of things outside of ones own perspective. 
Another cognitive aspect of this age is “centration” or focusing on one aspect of an event in 
isolation to interpret or attribute the entire event. Lastly, and perhaps most significant, is the 
inability to transform or reverse thoughts. Taking “irreversibility” from the perspective of affect 
would suggest that preoperational children cannot access other feelings, thoughts and object 
representations associated with one affect while in the grips of another. For example, “I hate 
you” for a child is likely “I have a hateful feeling towards you right now”, though is deeply felt 
as the former and cannot be seen otherwise in the moment—yet as the affect switches to another, 
the child then cannot access the previous version of the situation, person or target of their anger. 
Similarly, mixed or ambivalent feelings are not experienced by the preoperational child 
(Thompson, 1986, p. 210). 
During this phase, there is some amount of attribution to self and other, though it is 
rudimentary and lacks individuated selves with inner psychological realities. Emotions are not 
yet represented outside of concrete observations such as body position, facial expressions. Affect 
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can be happening or located in similarly physical ways: it is outside of the self, moving toward, 
away or “lodged inside” the self. The child is more likely to have anger rather than be angry. An 
emotion might similarly be “warded-off, expelled, or eliminated in some way.” (Thompson, 
1986, p. 214) Affects here cannot be reversed, but they can cycle rapidly and be successive 
without being integrated or being consciously related. The child may have some vague sense that 
they are the “doer” but without agency.  They may have the beginnings of guilt or regret but only 
for the consequences of the affect-event.  
Level Three. During the concrete operational phase (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), which 
occurs roughly around age 6 and lasting through early adolescence, reversibility becomes 
increasingly possible (Thompson, 1986, p. 211). This ability marks the shifting development of a 
number of important aspects of affect maturity. The development of reversibility in affect terms 
means that the child can realize that the present emotion can change and that an object can be 
evaluated outside of the present emotion. However, at this level, when affects are reversed, it is 
without the awareness of how individual internal states influence affect. Though inner life is 
known to exist for the self and other, they do not exist independently.  For example, while both 
individuals may still be caught in the same emotion, when emotions do differ, the other’s 
emotion compliments the emotion of the self or is in direct reaction or compliment to the self’s 
emotion somehow. The child cannot understand that despite two people having the same emotion 
it could be for two different reasons. Emotions no longer intrude from the outside, but external 
situations/objects are still seen as the cause of emotions within the self, rather than independent 
feelings(Thompson, 1986, p. 214). Similarly, two affects can be held simultaneously, but they 
are segregated due to the lack of awareness of the inner psychological experience: the child 
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might feel hurt and angry, but not angry in reaction to being hurt. Affects are still vaguely 
described or confused in this phase. 
During the phase of concrete operations children are aware of faked emotions and some 
choice is involved in acting on emotions, due to the introduction of internalized social 
expectations (Thompson, 1986). However, Camras and Shuster, found that children’s ability to 
“dissimulate their expressive behavior” or mask emotions with a more favorable response, has 
been seen to start in preschool children as early as age 3 (2013). However, these studies were 
interested in observable behaviors rather than the child’s consciousness of these behaviors, their 
intention or their or their ability to discern similar behavior in others.  
Developmental Differences in Affect Maturity. The developmental differences in affect 
at different ages is well represented in two studies comparing children in the age range of 4-5 
year old to children who are aged 7-8 (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Strayer, 1986). In a comparison 
of boys and girls, each of whom were asked to describe what would make someone happy, sad, 
angry etc., Strayer found that there were significant age differences in the contextual 
explanations of emotions. 7-8 year olds used significantly more interpersonal responses (e.g., 
“sad because the boys teased him”) than the 4-5 year olds, who gave explanations based on 
material goods (e.g., “happy because she gets presents”) or environmental events (e.g., “angry 
because the wind blew her balloon away”). In fact, the 4-5 year old group had so many responses 
related to “food” (e.g., “getting to eat cookies all the time”) and “animals” (e.g., “having to go 
where the raccoons can get you”) that researchers added these response categories post-hoc 
(Strayer, 1986).  
A second study also addressed different understandings of emotion in children. The study 
looked at how children described the emotions of two children in a story told through a 3-frame 
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image sequence where one child stole the candy of the other. Both victim and victimizer had 
neutrally affective expressions. Significant age differences emerged in the stated feeling state of 
the victimizer; all but one 4 year old attributed a singular positive feeling to the victimizer, 
whereas 8 year olds were just as likely to assign the victimizer with negative or mixed 
negative/positive emotions as positive emotion. Lastly, there were also strong age differences in 
the rationale of feelings for both victimizer and victim: 4 year olds described emotions through 
the loss or gain of material things, whereas 8 year olds were much more likely to point to the 
emotional consequences of violating morals or being betrayed by others (Arsenio & Kramer, 
1992). In terms of affect maturity, this displays important developmental differences. The 
attribution of emotion for 4 year olds is concrete—about a material, measurable gain or loss, 
which is partially connected to this age group’s relatively less differentiated self, other and 
environment. In the 7-8 year olds, affect has become linked more directly to relationships 
between self and other: the loss of candy is secondary to the betrayal and hurt from having 
someone steal from them. 
Level Four. In adolescence, affect maturity shifts again. There is individuation at this 
stage, with affects being attributed to individuals, but in a one-dimensional and inflexible way. 
Part-object like characteristics such as gender, occupation and so on are the main means for 
meaning-making of affect characteristics and the assumed inner motivations/wishes of others. 
Conflicts within the subject’s emotions are recognized, but not well tolerated or resolved. The 
situation/cause is interpreted/modified by the person as an individual and the cause can be quite 
complex/contradictory within the individual, situation/event, but do not modify one another. This 
is the beginning of reversibility. Decisions can now be made more thoughtfully, thinking through 
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actions and options rather than just inhibiting a certain response. Thus, remorse is felt for 
impulsive responses.  
Level Five. Adult affect maturity displays the highest levels of differentiation and 
integration of the self, other and affect. Thompson explains this best, “Self and other are 
perceived as individuated affective beings with enduring inner dispositions and capabilities that 
affect their emotional responsiveness.” (1981, p. 105) The cause of emotion, even if connected to 
external events, is evaluated outside of the emotion it causes. For example, the ability to realize 
the other who inspired the emotional reaction in the self did so without intending to, or 
recognizing this reaction is due to an idiosyncratic sensitivity. Affects are seen as an important 
part of an individual’s self-history and conflicting emotions are accepted and tolerated when 
needed. 
 The most central changes in affect maturity during childhood are in the context of the 
changing relationship between self and other. A stark example of how experience of the self and 
other are limited without affect is seen in alexithymic adult patients. Alexithymics suffer from a 
deficit in the ability to identify emotions, describe them to others, or, in some cases, recognize 
emotions in others. In other words, without affect, these individuals struggle to separate and 
connect aspects of the self and others. It is unsurprising then, that alexithymics often have 
trouble differentiating between the physical sensations of emotional arousal and other somatic 
sensations, leading to misinterpreted signs of physical illness.  
Making use of Thompson’s Affect Maturity Scale (1981) and a measure of self-other 
differentiation, Hering conducted a study of adult chronic pain outpatients (1987). Nearly half 
the sample met criteria for Alexithymia and when compared to those who did not meet criteria 
for alexithymia, alexithymics had significantly lower affect maturity and self-other 
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differentiation (Hering, 1987). Additionally, post-hoc analysis also provided evidence of the 
alexithymic individuals’ confusion between affect and somatic sensations. While the AMS and 
Thompson’s view of affect are deeply rooted in the cognitive and structural understandings of 
affect, this view also assumes that maturing interactions with others are deeply connected to the 
level of maturity affectively. This can also be seen as affects developing within and in relation to 
various object relational constellations.  “Put simply, you can’t have a “self” and an “other” 
without affect.” (Tuber, 2012, p. 29) Affects are the “experiential medium” through which 
internalization takes place. 
  Affect tolerance is an important component to affect maturity—as affects mature they 
also become easier to tolerate. At all levels of maturity, defenses may be used against affect. The 
type of defenses activated are likely influenced by the experienced level of affect maturity in that 
moment and the capacity for cognitive complexity. Additionally, these defenses operate in 
different ways to manage affect. For example, lower affect maturity levels are likely to require 
more primitive “all-or-none” defenses such as denial, avoidance, and withdrawal, which 
shutdown affective experience, unlike more mature defenses, such as displacement that allow 
affect, if altered. (Thompson, 1981, p. 91). Tolerance of affect is a key aspect of affect maturity 
and the need for defensive response, but is also not always constant across all affective 
experience. For example, someone could be high functioning, both in terms of affect maturity 
and defense use, but regress when confronted with their own anger that is difficult to tolerate due 
to the meaning of anger to the individual within their psychic history. On the other hand, 
Thompson hypothesizes that individuals who have “a widespread inhibition of affect, or other 
pervasive characterological defenses against affect” are unlikely to avoid some amount of 
significant affect immaturity and some related delays of development (1981, p. 91). 
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Projective Assessment 
Though first used with adults, the use of projective methods in the assessment of children 
has a long history, dating back to the 1940’s. This early application of projective assessment to 
children reflects the interest in children’s inner worlds. Also in the 1940’s, was the work of Roy 
Schafer, David Rapaport and Merton Gill who applied psychodynamic theory to projective 
assessment in order to examine personality and ego functioning (Rapaport, Schafer, & Gill, 
1946) For example, all assessment responses could be considered a combination of external 
structure and individual personality structure, yet projective tests provide less external structure 
so as to allow more space for the expression of the individual’s personality structure (Rapaport, 
1967).   
The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935; Murray, 1943) is one 
of the most commonly used projective tests for both children and adults. During the TAT, the 
individual is presented with evocative images printed in black and white on a series of cards, 
usually chosen beforehand by the assessor. This task requires the respondent to tell a story about 
the card including: (1) what is happening currently (2) what led up to the current situation (3) 
what will happen in the future (4) what are the characters thinking and (5) what are they feeling. 
Unlike other projective tests that are more ambiguous, the TAT imagery is meant to pull for 
strong reactions. Tuber aptly states that: “the TAT is a storytelling task under morbid 
conditions.” (Tuber, 2012, p. 113) In these conditions, the TAT is particularly well poised to 
observe affect and its level of maturity as well as the defenses that are potentially employed to 
manage these affects. 
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Summary and Hypotheses 
The empirical literature exploring the cognitive components, developmental shifts and 
environmental factors in developing affect and defense provides evidence for the theoretical 
frame of this study. Together, affect and defense influence both internal and external 
experiences, but perhaps most importantly, manage and shape the boundary between inner and 
outer experience. As the experience of the self and other becomes more differentiated and 
integrated, more complex and subtle defenses are employed against similarly developing affect. 
Cognitive abilities, which often increase with age, are an important factor in the complexity of 
defense that is potentially used and the nuance of the emotions experienced.  Similarly, 
environmental stressors, both current and past, influence the dynamic between affect and 
defense.  
Beyond the theoretical assumption that connects affect and defense in a protective 
pact to maintain psychological equilibrium, we can now see evidence that suggests a more 
nuanced relationship. Theory suggests that the level of affect maturity (e.g., the affect-event) 
must be met with a complementary defensive reaction (e.g., denial) to best manage the type of 
affect. Therefore, higher levels of affect maturity will be matched with higher proportions of 
mature defense use. Put another way, beyond the assumption that upsetting affect results in 
defense use, it seems likely that particular levels of affect maturity and defense are matched in 
terms of the developmental level and cognitive complexity of the individual or the individual’s 
reaction to a particular event. This assumption, that the level of affect maturity will be more 
adaptively managed by a developmentally matched defense, is the central hypothesis of this 
study and is partially represented by the additional hypotheses that age will be related to both 
affect maturity and defense use.  
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Methods 
 This study has been built upon a preliminary study addressing child assessment and 
treatment of child patients at the Psychological Center, an independent community based mental 
health clinic located in West Harlem, New York City.  Participants are children and adolescents, 
aged 5 – 16 years, who sought psychological services at the Psychological Center between 2009-
2017. The current study focuses on the participants’ response to the Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935). TAT transcripts were assessed using both the Affect Maturity 
Scale (AMS) (Thompson, 1981), and the Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM) (Cramer, 1991). 
 The current study addresses the hypothesis that there is a developmental relationship 
between defense mechanisms (as measured by the DMM) and affect maturity (as measured by 
the AMS) in children and adolescents. More specifically, that more primitive affect will be 
associated with more primitive defense use. Using these preexisting TAT data, this study 
empirically explores the relationship between affect and defense use in children. 
Participants 
 There are 52 participants in this study, ranging from age 5 to 16 years old. As the TAT 
was part of the intake protocol within the Psychological Center, all children were consecutively 
selected, without any additional screening procedures, as they presented for psychological 
treatment. Children were participants in the project From Child Assessment to Child Treatment; 
a Preliminary Investigation through the Child Intake Research Group (CIRG), under primary 
investigator Steve Tuber, Ph.D. Children were administered the Rorschach, the TAT and The 
Raven Progressive Matrices. Informed consent was given to and affirmed by all caregivers in the 
study, with the IRB approval process fully engaged. Demographic information was also collected 
from these participants, including their age, gender, IQ, ethnicity/race and socioeconomic status.  
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Instruments 
Children in the CIRG sample were assessed over the course of 1-3 assessment meetings 
with the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach, 1942), The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; 
Morgan & Murray, 1935) and The Raven Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1965). In addition, a 
separate assessment was competed with the parent or caregivers’ of the child who were 
interviewed with the Parental Development Interview (Slade, Aber, Berger, Bresgi, & Kaplan, 
2003). Only data from the TAT are relevant to this study. Thus, the other measures will not be 
discussed further. 
The Thematic Apperception Test. (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935) The TAT is one of 
the most commonly used projective tests for both children and adults. It consists of the 
presentation of a number of cards to participants; each card depicting a drawing or photographic 
black and white image. The cards all contain a level of ambiguity, but vary widely in terms of 
content, situation and characters. The number of characters depicted, their mood, actions and 
emotional expression varies greatly. The underlying assumption of the TAT is that the cards will 
elicit, through the narratives told for each card, an individual’s underlying motivations, 
assumptions and worries. 
The same 10-12 TAT cards were presented to all 52 participants in this study. Cards 1, 2, 
3BM, 3GF, 4, 6BM, 7GF, 8BM, 12M, 13MF, 18GF, 13B were chosen for their variety of 
themes. The variance in how many cards were given is due to the earlier protocols that required 
particular TAT cards be exchanged based on biological sex and assumed gender. Specifically, 
cards 6BM and 7GF as well as 12M and 18GF were pairs not always used together, but often 
traded in or out on the aforementioned reasoning based on biological sex of the child.  Protocols 
that did not include the minimum of 10 cards were excluded from this study. The TAT presents 
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the respondent with the basic requirements to tell a story, created from five questions: (1) what is 
happening currently? (2) what led up to the current situation? (3) what will happen in the future? 
(4) what the characters are thinking? (5) what they are feeling? The story that is constructed by 
the participant is ideally considered both from the perspective of actual content, but also from 
how the narrative is constructed and organized (Schafer, 1958). 
The Affect Maturity Scale. This scale looks at the intersection between cognition and 
affect. The AMS is structured to rate TAT responses on a scale of 1-5. Each of the transcribed 
Thematic Apperception Test narrative was scored by two raters blind to additional participant 
information (e.g., demographical data, DMM scoring) using the Thompson Affect Maturity 
Scale. Though the Affect Maturity Scale has only been used in one application to children, it has 
shown adequate inter-rater reliability (Cohen, 1988) with the aforementioned procedure on 
children’s TAT protocols in Goudsmit (2010) (kappa coefficients of 0.78, 95% CI: 0.74 to 0.83). 
Additionally, the AMS has been shown to have discriminate validity for both IQ and age, but not 
education level in adults (Thompson, 1981). 
Defense Mechanism Manual.  This manual provides a guide to coding TAT responses 
for three types of defense: denial, projection and identification. Each of the three defenses has 7 
subtypes of that defense that are also codeable. Since it is expected that TAT narratives often 
contain more than one codeable defense, all instances of defense use are coded.  
Procedures 
As a part of the CIRG project, children took part in a battery of projective and nonverbal 
intelligence assessments. These assessments were usually completed in 1 to 2 sessions during the 
same time period that the child was going through the intake process for psychological treatment 
at the Psychological Center. In some circumstances, 3 sessions were required. A separate 
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interview was also conducted with the child’s parent or guardian to administer the Parental 
Development Interview (Slade et al., 2003). These data are presented to CIRG and the intake 
therapist in order to inform the clinical recommendations of the intake. 
Testing was performed in a small, quiet therapy room within the Psychological Center. 
Each child was administered the TAT as part of a short battery of projective and nonverbal 
intelligence testing. The TAT was administered before the Rorschach administration, but not 
necessarily in the same session. Responses were transcribed and the data were de-identified.  
A panel of two advanced doctoral level clinical psychology students, blind to age and 
demographic information of the participants, with training in the Affect Maturity Scale, scored 
the TAT responses according to the guidelines of the Affect Maturity Scale. A panel of two other 
advanced doctoral level clinical psychology students, also blind to age and demographic 
information of the participants, scored the TAT participant responses according to the guidelines 
of the Defense Mechanism Manual. Scores were assessed for inter-rater agreement using 
correlational analyses and in cases of disagreement, a licensed clinical psychologist previously 
trained in the aforementioned scoring systems scored contested TAT responses. 
Hypotheses  
The main hypotheses and foci of the study are to better understand the relationship of 
affect and defense in childhood and adolescence, as measured by the Affect Maturity Scale 
(AMS Thompson, 1981) and the Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM Cramer, 1991), among 
children and adolescents presenting for intake at The Psychological Center.  
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Hypothesis I: Confirming Anne Thompsons’ theory of affect maturity (1981; 1985), results will 
demonstrate a statistically significant positive correlation between age and level of affect 
maturity. 
 
Hypothesis II: Replicating past findings (Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 1991; Cramer, 2006) results 
will show a statistically significant positive correlation between the proportion of mature defense 
use and age. 
 
Hypothesis III: The level of affect maturity will be positively correlated with an increasing 
proportion of mature defense use.  
Data Analysis 
The TAT narratives of children presenting for psychological treatment were coded to 
identify the levels of affect maturity displayed in each narrative using the Affect Maturity Scale. 
The mean of affect maturity was calculated for each participant’s TAT record. These same TAT 
narratives were coded to identify each use of three defenses, denial, projection and identification, 
as described in the DMM. The ratio of these three defenses was calculated for each participant’s 
TAT record from the raw coding of defense use. Sample demographics were analyzed and 
descriptive statistics were computed for the study variables. For hypotheses I and II, correlations 
determine direction and significance between predictor (age) and outcome (proportions of 
defense use and mean level of affect maturity) variables. For hypothesis III correlations 
determine the direction and significance of the relationships between mean level of affect 
maturity and proportions of defense mechanism use. 
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Results 
 The focus of this study was to examine the nature of the relationship between affect and 
defense in a clinical sample of children and adolescents.  Affect maturity (AM) was measured 
using the Thompson Affect Maturity Scale (AMS) (1981), a scale created to capture qualitatively 
differing levels of emotional sophistication within TAT narratives as defined by both object 
relational theory (Mayman, 1967) and Piagetian (1969) understandings of cognitive 
development. Defense mechanisms (DM) were measured using Cramer’s Defense Mechanism 
Manual (DMM) (1991), a detailed manual developed around three defenses that have been 
shown to represent differing levels of cognitive and object relational development within TAT 
narratives (Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 1997; Cramer & Block, 1998; Cramer, 2007; A. Freud, 1965). 
A review of the literature led to the hypotheses that 1) age would be positively correlated with 
AMS scores and similarly, that 2) age would be positively correlated with proportions of mature 
defenses and negatively with immature defenses. Lastly, 3) it was hypothesized that there would 
be a positive correlation between AMS scores and DM proportions due to the theoretical 
assumptions regarding the intertwined nature of defense and affect in terms of cognitive 
development.  
 The results section will begin with a review of the demographic and background 
information of the participants in the sample, followed by the sample’s performance on the 
Affect Maturity Scale and Defense Mechanism Manual. The statistical analyses used to 
investigate this study’s three main hypotheses are then addressed. First, the relationship between 
age and AMS will be explored in order to investigate the potential role maturation has upon the 
ability to conceive of and express increasingly complex affective situations and experiences. 
Second, the relationship between age and DM proportions of denial, projection and identification 
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will be explored. Lastly, the relationship between AMS and DM will be addressed in order to 
illuminate the connection between affect and defense maturity. 
A number of exploratory analyses were performed by grouping participants into three age 
groups. The grouping was informed by prior research using the DMM and Piagetian theory 
regarding cognitive development. These groups will be examined for shifts in defense use and 
affect. 
Preliminary Analyses and Demographic Characteristics 
 The basic demographic characteristics of the study sample’s 52 children and adolescents 
are displayed in Table 1. All the children and adolescents were between the ages of 5 years, 3 
months and 16 years, 5 months (M = 10 years, 4 months; SD = 2 years, 8 months). Gender and 
biological sex were not differentiated and hence presented as a binary male/female option, thus 
the incidence of possible non-binary gendered children is not represented within this sample. 
With that caveat in mind, 34.6% (n  = 18) of the sample were identified as female, while 65.4% 
(n = 35) were identified as male. It should be noted that the average age for females (M = 11 
years, 6 months) is nearly two years older than the average age for males (M = 9 years, 8 
months).  It is not uncommon for clinical samples of pre-adolescent children to contain more 
males than females, though this pattern begins to shift in adolescence, where an increase in 
females seeking services is often seen (World Health Organization, 2002). Gender differences in 
terms of the hypotheses will be addressed below.  The collection of caregiver-reported 
race/ethnicity was inconsistent and, at times, entirely absent or unknown (21.15%, n = 11) within 
this sample. For this reason, analyses of possible race/ethnicity differences were not performed. 
Despite this missing information, the known race/ethnicity data is believed to be representative 
of the entire sample, as it echoes similar percentages of our clinic population and the surrounding 
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community.  The vast majority of this sample are people of color (71.16%), with 
White/Caucasian in the minority (7.69%). Specifically, Hispanic/Latino (25%), Black/African 
American (21.15%), Mixed Race and Ethnicity (21.15%), Asian (1.92%) and Other (1.92%) 
populations were represented in the overall sample. 
 
Table 1    
 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
 
 All Participants 
(N = 52) 
Female 
(n = 18; 34.6%) 
Male 
(n = 35; 65.4%) 
Mean Age (Std Dev.) 
 
10y, 4m (2y, 8m) 11y, 6m (2y, 8m) 9y, 8m (2y, 6m) 
    
Race/Ethnicity    
Black/African-
American 
11 (21.15%) 3 (16.66%) 8   (23.52%) 
Hispanic/Latino 13 (25%) 3 (16.66%) 10 (29.41%) 
Mixed Race& Ethnicity 11 (21.15%) 5 (27.77%) 6   (17.64%) 
White/Caucasian 4   (7.69%) 0 (0%) 4   (11.76%) 
Asian 1   (1.92%) 1 (5.55%) 0   (0%) 
Other 1   (1.92%) 1 (5.55%) 0   (0%) 
Unknown 11 (21.15%) 5 (27.77%) 6   (17.64%) 
 
 
Defense Mechanism and Affect Maturity Measurement 
TAT protocols were assessed using the Defense Mechanism Manual (DMM Cramer, 
1991) and the Affect Maturity Scale (AMS Thompson, 1981).  Each TAT card and associated 
response was given an affect maturity (AM) score of 0-5; 0 referring to no affect event occurring 
in the response, 1 referring to the most primitive affective events and 5 referring the most mature 
affective events. Means of each TAT record’s AMS scores were used in the statistical analyses 
detailed in the hypotheses section. Defense scoring was categorical (1 = denial, 2 = projection 
and 3 = identification) and defenses were scored as many times as they appeared. DM scores 
were calculated as proportions of each defense across the record. In other words, a percentage of 
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the overall defense use was given for each of the three defenses for each record. This method 
helps to manage the potential influence of differing defense frequency between longer and 
shorter narratives. The same statistical analyses were employed to further explore the possible 
influence of gender in each hypothesis. Lastly, ancillary analyses were performed by grouping 
participants into three age-based groups: 63-95 months (n = 9); 96-143 months (n = 28); 144-197 
months (n = 13) that roughly reference Piagetian stages of cognitive development and prior 
findings from research that employed the DMM to represent shifts in defense use across similar 
age groups (Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 1997; Cramer, 2007; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969).  
Inter-Rater Reliability 
Two pairs of advanced doctoral students in clinical psychology worked on the AMS and 
DMM scoring. All were aware of this study’s hypotheses, but blind to all other participant data 
such as name, age, gender, race/ethnicity and diagnoses as well as being blind to the scores of the 
other coders. For the AMS and DMM, one coder within the respective pair coded the entire 
sample of 52 TAT records, while the other coded a sample of 11 randomly selected TATs for 
inter-rater reliability purposes.  Each record contained 10-12 cards. The AMS inter-rater 
reliability was calculated from the TAT record means using Pearson correlation two-tailed test; it 
was both strong [r(10) = .913, p < .01] and significant. DMM inter-rater reliability was 
calculated separately for each defense proportion using Pearson correlation two-tailed tests.  For 
denial and projection, inter-rater reliability was both strong [r(9) = .819, p < .01;   r(9) = .805, p 
< .01, respectively] and significant. Identification inter-rater reliability was also strongly and 
significantly related [r(9) = .644, p < .05]. 
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Hypotheses 
Relationship Between Age and Affect Maturity 
 The first hypothesis of this study was that age and affect maturity levels would be 
positively correlated, suggesting that increases in developmental maturation would similarly lead 
to increases in maturity of affect. In order to test this hypothesis a Pearson correlational two-
tailed analysis of participants’ age (in months) and AMS mean scores was performed. As 
predicted, there was a significant, strong and positive relationship [r(50) = .556, p < .01] between 
age and AMS means. 
 To further explore this relationship, additional analyses were run to explore the possible 
role of gender. When males and females were separated, the male group continued to show a 
significant, strong and positive correlation [r(32) = .623, p < .01] between AMS means and age, 
yet the female group’s correlation was no longer significant, it remains positive [r(16) = .318, p 
= n.s.]. With this finding in mind, we looked at the possibility that gender was a moderator of the 
relationship between AMS means and age. This analysis showed that gender was not a 
significant moderator between AMS mean and age, rather that the relationship between AMS 
mean and age is not dependent on gender. This finding suggests that other factors may be at 
work such as the considerable differences between the participants within the male and female 
groups. The female group is smaller than the male group (n = 18 vs. n = 34) and older than the 
male group (female M = 11 years, 6 months, SD = 2 years, 8 months; male M = 9 years, 8 
months, SD = 2 years, 6 months). Perhaps most important in terms of the theoretical basis for the 
AMS mean and age hypothesis, is that the female group only has one participant below the age 
of 9 years, 2 months, whereas there are eight males under this age. Taken together, it appears that 
sample size and the aforementioned skew of clinical samples in terms of gender and age at which 
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one seeks treatment is more likely to be the reason for the female group’s insignificant 
correlation between AMS mean and age. 
Relationship Between Age and Defense Mechanism Use 
 The second hypothesis of this study was that age and defense mechanism proportions 
would be positively correlated for more mature defense proportions (e.g., identification) and 
negatively correlated for age and immature defenses (e.g., denial). As expected, there was a 
significant, moderate negative correlation [r(50) = -.337, p < .05] between denial proportions and 
age. Similarly, as predicted, there was a significant, strong positive correlation [r(50) = .635, p < 
.01] between identification and age. Unexpectedly, there was no significant relationship between 
age and projection  
[r(50) = -.134, p = n.s.]. 
 As with the prior hypothesis, gender differences for the relationship between age and 
each defense was explored. In the male group, the correlation of age and denial proportions 
remained a significant moderate negative correlation, though slightly stronger [r(32) = -.369; p < 
.05] than the overall sample [r(50) = -.337, p < .05], whereas the same relationship for females 
remained negative, but insignificant and weak [r(16) = -.077, p = n.s.]. As with the overall age 
and projection proportions, both relationships were insignificant and negative. However, the 
female group remained more similar to the overall age and projection proportion with 
insignificant, though moderately negative correlations  [overall r(50) = -.337, p < .05; female 
r(16) = -.309, p = n.s.] than did the male group, which displayed an insignificant, weakly 
negative correlation [r(32) = -.062, p = n.s.]. Following a similar pattern to denial, age and 
identification for males remained a significant, strong positive correlation [r(32) = .683; p < .01] 
and the female group showed an insignificant, moderate positive correlation [r(16) = .397, p = 
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n.s.]. Again, due to these correlational differences between male and female groups and each 
group with the overall sample, gender was explored as a possible moderator for age and denial 
proportions as well as age and identification proportions. As with AMS mean and age, there 
were no significant findings for gender as a moderator between age and denial or age and 
identification. Again, this finding suggests that perhaps the differences in sample size and age 
between the two gender groups is more likely the reason for the differences in correlational 
relationships compared to the overall sample. 
Relationship Between Affect Maturity and Defense Mechanism Use 
 The third hypothesis of this study was that AMS means and defense mechanism 
proportions would be positively correlated for more mature defense proportions and negatively 
correlated for less mature defense proportions. As hypothesized, AMS means and proportions of 
identification had a positive, significant and strong correlational relationship [r(50) = . 588, p < 
.01]. Similarly, AMS means and proportions of denial had a negative, significant and moderate 
relationship [r(50) = -.483, p < .01]. As with age and projection, the relationship of projection 
with AMS means was weak and insignificant [r(50) = .082, p = n.s.]. 
 Gender differences were also explored for each defense proportion with AMS means. In 
terms of denial proportions and AMS mean, males continued to have a significant, though 
slightly more moderate, negative correlation (r(32) = -.462; p < .01) than the overall sample 
[r(50) = -.483, p < .01]. The female group’s denial proportions and AMS means correlation 
remained moderate and negative, but was no longer significant [r(16) = -.465, p = n.s.] as seen in 
the overall sample. Despite the AMS mean and projection proportion correlations not being 
significant for males and females, as with the overall sample, they do differ slightly from the 
overall sample’s strength and direction, which was weakly positive [r(50) = .082, p = n.s.]. 
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Female AMS and projection proportion was instead weakly negative [r(16) = -.057, p = n.s.], 
whereas male AMS and projection proportion was still positive, but slightly less weakly [r(32) = 
.148, p = n.s.]. Similar to the overall sample ([r(50) = . 588, p < .01], AMS means and 
identification proportions remained strongly and positively correlated for both males [r(32) = 
.552; p < .01] and for females [r(16) = .547; p < .05]. Gender as a moderator analyses showed 
that gender was not a significant moderator for AMS means and denial proportions nor was it for 
AMS means and identification proportions. This again mirrors findings in the prior gender is not 
a significant moderator in the other two hypotheses. 
Table 2 
 
Correlational Relationships Between Variables 
 
 Age Affect Maturity  Denial Projection Identification 
 
Age 
 
 
- 
 
.556** 
 
-.337* 
 
.134 
 
.635** 
Affect Maturity 
 
.556** - -.483** .082 .588** 
Denial 
 
-.337* -.483** - - - 
Projection 
 
.134 .082 - - - 
Identification .635** .588** - - - 
 
*  p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
Ancillary Analyses 
 Ancillary analyses were performed by grouping participants into three age-based groups: 
63-95 months or 5 years and 4 months-7 years, 11 months (n = 9); 96-143 months or 8 years-11 
years, 11 months  (n = 28); 144-197 months or 12 years-16 years, 5 months (n = 13). These 
groups roughly reference Piagetian stages of cognitive development and prior findings from 
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research that employed the DMM to represent shifts in defense use across similar age groups 
(Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 1997; Cramer, 2007; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969).  
 A one-way ANOVA was performed between the three age groups for each defense 
proportion (see table 3) in order to determine any potentially significant differences between 
groups for each defense. There were a significant differences of denial proportions F(2, 49) = 
3.299, p = .045. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test show significant mean score 
differences (mdiff = .178, SE = .071, p = .041) between the youngest group (M = .559, SD = 
.153) and oldest group (M = .380, SD = .093), while the middle group (M = .477, SD = .194) did 
not differ significantly in terms of denial when compared to the middle and oldest groups. There 
were also significant differences between the average identification proportions F(2, 49) = 
16.934, p < .001 (youngest: M = .063. SD = .045 ; middle: M = .192, SD = .107; oldest: M = 
.302, SD = .094) and post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated significant mean 
score differences between all three groups (youngest vs. middle: mdiff = -.128, SE = .036, p = 
.003; youngest vs. oldest: mdiff = -.238, SE = .041, p = .000; middle vs. oldest: mdiff = -.109, SE 
= .031, p = .003). While no significant differences were found between the different age groups’ 
projection proportions F(2, 49) = .500, p = .610 it is of note that the proportional average use of 
projection is very similar across all three age groups (youngest: M = .377, SD = .120; middle: M 
= .330, SD = .170; oldest: M = .317, SD = .091). Similarly, use of all three defenses in the oldest 
group are proportionally very similar (denial: M = .380, SD = .093; projection: M = .317, SD = 
.091; identification: M = .302, SD = .094). Denial use wanes as the group age increases, but 
remains the most frequently used defense proportionally across the three groups. Directly 
opposite, identification proportions increase as the group age increases, but it remains the least 
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used defense proportionally in all groups. An analysis of gender differences for each defense and 
group did not show significant differences from the overall sample. 
Table 3 
 
Proportional Defense Use Between Age Groups 
 
 
 
 To further explore shifts in affect maturity between the three age groups, AMS means, 
medians, modes, standard deviations and ranges were calculated for each group (see table 4) and 
a one-way ANOVA was performed for the three age groups in terms of the six possible AMS 
scores (0-5) (see table 5). While AMS scores were treated as a continuous variable in the primary 
analyses, table 5 represents each AMS level categorically in a proportional calculation in order to 
see possible age group differences in use of particular levels of affect maturity. No participants in 
this sample scored level 5 on the AMS for any narrative, making the AMS score of level 4 the 
highest throughout the sample. Significant differences between groups for AMS scores of 0 (no 
Youngest Middle Oldest 
Denial 0.559 0.477 0.38 
Projection 0.377 0.33 0.317 
Identification 0.063 0.192 0.302 
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affect event) [F(2, 49) = 4.394, p = .018], level 1 (most primitive affect event) [F(2, 49) = 6.551, 
p = .003] and level 3 (middle high end of maturity of affect event) [F(2, 49) = 5.257, p = .009] 
were found. No significant differences were found for level 2 [F(2, 49) = .594, p = .556] or level 
4 [F(2, 49) = 11.035, p = .000]. Post-hoc comparisons of narratives that lacked any affect event 
(AMS score of 0) using the Tukey HSD test show significant mean score differences between the 
youngest group (M = .262, SD = .255) and oldest group (M = .363, SD = .071) (youngest vs. 
oldest: mdiff = .225, SE = .080, p = .019), while the middle group (M = .173, SD = .201) did not 
differ significantly from either group. In narratives that scored a level 1 on the AMS scale, the 
most primitive use of affect, post-hoc analysis using the Tukey HSD test indicated there were 
significant differences between the youngest (M = .223, SD = .213) and middle (M = .085, SD = 
.099) groups (youngest vs. middle: mdiff = .137, SE = .045, p = .012) as well as between the 
youngest and oldest groups (M = .041, SD = .071) (youngest vs. oldest: mdiff = .181, SE = .051, 
p = .003). Similarly, for the AMS score of level 3, there were significant differences found in 
post-hoc Tukey HSD tests between the youngest (M = .108, SD = .125) and middle groups (M = 
.380, SD = .303) (youngest vs. middle: mdiff = -.272, SE = .099, p = .024) as well as the 
youngest and oldest (M = .459, SD = .221) groups (youngest vs. oldest: mdiff = -.350, SE = .111, 
p = .008). Taken together, the tendency towards the most primitive affect (AMS = 1) shifts 
downwards after the age of 8, whereas the understanding of a relatively more mature affect 
(AMS = 3) seems to become significantly more possible after the age of 8 and more so after the 
age of 12. 
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Table 4 
 
Affect Maturity by Age Group 
 
 
                               Youngest                  Middle                     Oldest 
  
Age Group Mean Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Youngest  1.361 1.5 1.5 .554 1.82 
Middle 2.003 2.09 1.58 .687 2.54 
Oldest 2.651 2.746 2.00 .586 2.00 
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Table 5 
 
Proportional Affect Level Between Age Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
Youngest Middle Oldest 
0 0.262 0.173 0.036 
1 0.223 0.085 0.041 
2 0.406 0.332 0.309 
3 0.108 0.38 0.459 
4 0 0.027 0.152 
5 0 0 0 
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Discussion 
 The present study explored the relationships among age, affect maturity and defense 
mechanism use in a diverse clinical sample of children and adolescents. The existing literature 
that informed this study’s hypotheses centered conceptually upon how both the kind of defenses 
used and the maturity of affective experience are developmentally based, that is, they develop 
alongside increasing cognitive and object relational abilities (Cramer, 1987; A. Freud, 1965; 
Thompson, 1981). Thus it was assumed that children of differing ages would show differing 
levels of cognitive maturity and object relational capacity. With this in mind it was expected that 
with increases in age, there would be increases in affect maturity and maturity of defense use.  
Similarly, it was predicted that affect maturity and defense use would tend to be matched in 
terms of maturity—in other words, the ability to use more mature defenses would suggest a 
higher affect maturity and vice versa. 
 The following discussion section will consider findings related to these initial predictions 
in depth, including additional information gained by grouping the participants into three groups 
based on age. Potential parallels between this study and others will be explored. Lastly, possible 
clinical uses and limitations will inform a consideration of potential areas of interest for future 
research. Throughout the discussion, it will be important to keep in mind that these findings are 
correlational in nature—limiting possible interpretations of the results.  
Developmental Shifts in Affect Maturity 
 One area this study explored was the relationship between affect maturity and 
chronological age with the aim of increasing a developmental understanding of affect maturity in 
children and adolescents. Thompson’s Affect Maturity Scale is based on theoretical assumptions 
regarding increasing cognitive and object relational development throughout childhood and 
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adolescence, but has not been used with a sample of children and adolescents prior to this study 
(Thompson, 1981; Thompson, 1985; Thompson, 1986). The current findings of this study 
support the initial hypothesis that affect maturity and age would rise together, seen through a 
strong, positive and significant correlational relationship between increasing age and increasing 
affect maturity. This lends credence to Thompson’s theory by supporting a developmentally 
driven shift in the ability to express, understand and interpret affective experiences over time.  
 Additional support for affect maturity following a developmental course was seen in age 
differences that emerged in ancillary analyses that looked at proportional use of each AMS level 
among three age groups: youngest (5 years, 4 months-7 years, 11 months), middle (8 years-11 
years, 11 months) and oldest (12 years-16 years, 5 months). Strikingly, none of the participants 
told narratives that reached a level 5 on the AMS. This level requires a very complex 
understanding of affects as expressing aspects of each individual’s psychological history as this 
history interplays with others, who similarly have their own complex psychological history. This 
type of thinking requires an adult-like cognitive ability as well as a flexible and thoughtful object 
relational life. It is likely that individuals must be firmly in the formal operations level of 
thinking (Piaget, 1936) before a score of five on the AMS is possible. Defensive processes that 
get in the way of higher level thinking, such as those warp reality (denial) or the boundary 
between self and other (projection) dominated across all three age groups and may also partially 
explain the difficulty in reaching a level 5 on affect maturity. In contrast, an AMS level 2 score 
was the most common score, accounting for at least a third of all expressed affect across the 
groups. Level 2 suggests the beginnings of affects being attributed to persons, but affect remains 
externalized and is not seen as a psychological state. The highest affect level reached was level 4, 
suggesting that one is able to differentiate the self and other, have some sense of the temporal 
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nature of affects and their psychological underpinnings—yet the complexity of individuals is 
limited. Individuals are seen through the lens of their gender, occupation etc. instead of their own 
individualized internal histories. This particular aspect of a level 4 response mirrors an aspect of 
identification, rather, to see people through their various social location roles rather than 
individualized experience.  
 A pattern of significant differences emerged between the groups for levels of 0, 1 and 3 
on the AMS: the youngest group had a significantly larger proportion of 0 and 1 scores when 
compared to both the middle and oldest groups and similarly, the youngest group had a 
significantly smaller proportion of level 3 scores when compared to the middle and oldest 
groups. No significant differences were found for AMS level proportions between the middle 
and oldest groups, however, AMS level proportions for 0, 1 and 2 trends down from youngest to 
oldest, while AMS level proportions for 3 and 4 trends up from youngest to oldest.   
 Each score that showed significant differences is worth exploring for its primary features. 
The most unique score given on the AMS was a 0. This is because a score of 0 represents the 
absence of any affect event occurring within the participant’s narrative and it is difficult to know 
the meaning of this absence. It could be theorized that 0 is representative of a complete 
avoidance that is more often turned to for the youngest group with children under the age of 8 
and this group did have the most “0” scores. Level 1 represents the most primitive affect—it 
colors the entire scene and is akin to a weather event, without reason or attribution to an 
individual. Again, we see that children under 8 are interpreting and expressing this type of affect 
significantly more often than their older peers. Level 3 represents an important shift from the 
prior levels: the beginnings of seeing affect as a psychological state, something that is no longer 
entirely concrete and externalized. Again the youngest group differs from the others, suggesting 
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that this level of complexity is less common in children under 8. This study shows a significant 
shift in affect maturity after the age of 8 moving away from more primitive, externalized and 
concrete affect maturity towards the ability to see affect as a psychological state within 
individuals.   
 A similar pattern emerged in two studies that examined emotional understanding in two 
groups of children. Strayer (1986) compared the contextual explanation of emotions from two 
groups of children, the first aged 4-5 years and the second, aged 7-8 years and found significant 
differences in their reasoning for emotional states presented. The older group used significantly 
more interpersonal or internal expectations to explain an emotional state, whereas the younger 
group tended to use more concrete explanations of receiving of material goods or externalized 
events that were not involved with individuals or their relationships. Arsenio and Kramer (1992) 
looked at the differences between a group of 4 year olds and a group of 8 year olds in terms of 
their understanding of the emotions in a story that depicted two children, one of whom steals 
candy from the other. The 4 year olds tended to focus their understanding of the emotion only 
upon material goods and whether or not the relevant child had candy or lost it (happy and sad, 
respectively). The 8 year olds took into account the internal experience of stealing or being 
stolen from as the primary experience related to emotion and this moral transgression negatively 
affected their read of how the victimizer might be feeling (e.g., guilty). While the ages are 
slightly different, these two studies and this current study reflect a possible shift in cognitive 
ability that is akin to Piaget’s understanding of the differences between preoperational and 
concrete operational stages of childhood cognitive development. Preoperational children 
(approximately age 2 to 7) are egocentric, struggling to see or acknowledge the perspective of 
others and tend to understand the world in very concrete, externally observable terms. In 
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contrast, egocentrism fades in the later stage of concrete operations (approximately age 7 to 11) 
allowing children to think about the thoughts and feelings of others, which would be required in 
order to reach  
level 3. 
Developmental Shifts in Defense Mechanism Use 
 This study sought to provide further evidence of developmental shifts in defense 
mechanism use as seen in the work of Cramer and to expand this understanding in a diverse 
clinical sample of children and adolescents. As is true of this entire study, underlying theoretical 
assumptions regarding cognitive and object relational development informed these assumptions 
as well. Thus, it was predicted that chronological age and defense proportions would be 
significantly correlated—more specifically, that age and primitive defense use would be 
negatively correlated, while age and more mature defenses would be positively correlated. The 
results of this study primarily support these predictions, with age and denial being significantly 
and negatively correlated as well as identification and age being significantly and positively 
correlated. Ancillary analyses provided both further evidence for expected shifts in defense use, 
particularly in terms of denial and identification, as well as an illuminating contrast to prior 
DMM studies that sampled non-clinical, more affluent and less diverse children of similar age 
groups. Contrary to prediction, projection had no significant correlations with age, nor did it 
have significant differences between age groups in ancillary analyses. However, the unexpected 
finding in regard to projection use suggests important possible differences with regard to this 
study’s demographic differences from comparable DMM studies. In fact, perhaps most 
interesting in terms of clinical understanding, is the unexpectedly high and consistent use (in 
comparison to prior studies) of relatively more primitive defenses across all three age groups. A 
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discussion of possible reasons for this difference in terms of this sample being a clinical one are 
discussed further below. 
 Denial represents the most primitive defense in this study. Denial requires little in terms 
of cognitive or object relational complexity: reality can be ignored and differentiation between 
self, other and external environment is not needed. This study provides evidence that use of 
denial is significantly related to age, decreasing with increasing age. Ancillary analyses that 
grouped children by age also showed that there were significant differences between children 
under 8 years old and children 12 years and older—the younger group used significantly more 
denial. Of note, while proportional denial use drops from the youngest to the middle to the oldest 
group (.559, .477 and .38 respectively), it remains the highest proportion of defense use 
throughout all three age groups. In studies of non-clinical populations, denial is expected to drop 
off significantly and not dominate defense use after age 8 (Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 1997; Cramer, 
2007).  
 A few explanations are possible for this pattern of denial use. It has been theorized that 
when an individual is under stress during childhood that they may become dependent on the 
defense that was most developmentally appropriate at that time and continue to use it in later 
ages (Cramer & Tracy, 2005). It is possible that many children and adolescents in this sample, 
who are presenting for psychological treatment, have had a greater need for defense mechanisms 
such as denial since they were young if we assume that they may have been dealing with a higher 
incidence of stressors and stress. In addition, this sample has a predominantly low SES and an 
increased use of denial has been seen in samples that are of a lower SES (Cramer, 2006; Cramer, 
2009a). While some have interpreted this as simply a reaction to higher levels of distress being 
present in a lower SES sample (Cramer, 2006), other studies have theorized that the inability to 
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change the very real circumstances of a lower SES status, such as poverty, requires a reality-
altering defense such as denial to counter related distress (Poikolainen et al., 1995). 
 Unexpectedly, the relationship between age and projection use was not significant and 
weakly positive. Prior studies suggested that projection use would increase around age 8 and 
wane around age 14 (Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 2009a; Cramer, 2007). This expected pattern could 
arguably be difficult to recognize within a correlational analysis due to its expected waxing and 
waning within the sample’s age range, however, ancillary analyses also suggested no major 
shifts. In fact, there were no significant differences between the youngest (under 8 years), middle 
(8 years to 11 years 11 months) and oldest (12 years to 16 years, 5 months) groups in their 
relative use of projection (.377, .33 and .317 respectively). One way to understand the finding 
that projection made up approximately one third of defense use regardless of age within this 
sample is to consider the defining characteristics of projection given that this sample is a clinical 
one. Projection within the DMM is defined by the attribution of hostile, aggressive and punishing 
characteristics to individuals or generally ominous story themes—in other words, projection here 
is an expression of disjointed, frightening and negative object relations. Many children who 
display psychological symptoms that might lead to seeking treatment are more likely to have 
experienced difficulty within their early and/or primary relationships, creating more negative 
object relational schemas and therefore a tendency towards projection as it is understood in the 
DMM. In addition, similar to the aforementioned understanding of the relatively higher than 
expected use of denial across groups, projection’s failure to wane with age could be understood 
as its overuse at a developmentally appropriate time (e.g., middle age group) in order to deal 
with heightened distress, that then continued into less developmentally appropriate ages (e.g., 
oldest age group) (Cramer & Tracy, 2005).  
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 Identification is the most mature of the defenses that were assessed within this study.  
The ability to use identification is a hallmark of more advanced cognitive abilities and object 
relations as well as being an important aspect of personality development during adolescence. 
More specifically, it requires not only a differentiation between self and other, but between self 
and multiple others, and the ability to create enduring internalized representations of others 
(Cramer, 1987). As predicted, age and identification use was significantly, strongly and 
positively correlated. In spite of its use being lower than expected for the oldest group in 
comparison to other studies (e.g., Cramer, 1987), ancillary analyses still provided significant 
findings of the expected increase in use of identification use with increasing age. Considering 
that expected shifts were depressed for denial and projection in comparison to other studies, the 
fact that each age grouping was found to be significantly different from the other in terms of 
their proportional identification use suggests that they are representative of unique and 
potentially important developmental shifts. The youngest group’s (under 8 years old) 
proportional use of identification was significantly different and lower in comparison to both the 
middle group (8 years to 11 years, 11 months) and the oldest group (12 years to 16 years, 5 
months), while the middle group was significantly different and lower than the oldest group in 
terms of identification use. This was the only defense that showed significant differences among 
all three age groups as would be expected from referencing other studies.  
The Relationship Between Defense Mechanism Use and Affect Maturity 
 The main aim of this study was to examine the relationship between defense use maturity 
and affect maturity. The relationship between affect and defense is often discussed theoretically, 
but few studies have examined the relationship directly with quantified measures of each. As has 
been discussed, this study assumes that maturity of defense and affect are both aspects of ego 
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development and in turn related to cognitive and object relational maturity.  Results of this study 
support the initial hypothesis that affect maturity and defense proportions would be significantly 
correlated. Further analyses of the initial hypothesis and ancillary analyses suggest that the 
pairing of lower AMS levels and use of denial as well as higher AMS levels paired with use of 
identification represent important developmental changes, even within a clinical sample. 
 As expected, affect maturity and denial proportions had a significant moderately negative 
correlation, supporting the idea that individuals with lower levels of affect maturity are more 
likely to use a higher proportion of denial while those with a higher level of affect maturity tend 
to use less denial. Adding to this understanding were the ancillary analyses that were performed 
to compare different age groups for proportional use of each defense and proportional use of 
each AMS level. In both affect maturity and defense use, the youngest group displayed the most 
significant differences when compared to the middle and oldest groups, suggesting that an 
important developmental shift may be occurring after the age of 8. Nearly half of the youngest 
group’s affective responses contained no affect or the most primitive level of affect. These types 
of affect level (0 and 1 respectively) differed in proportional use significantly from their peers in 
both the middle and oldest groups. In addition, this same youngest group used denial 
significantly more often than the middle and oldest group.  There are a few plausible 
explanations for this intersection of lower affect maturity and denial. First, the tendency to tell 
narratives that contained no affect event is reminiscent of a very strong use of denial—the affect 
within the card is not allowed expression or to come into consciousness at all. Similarly, the 
other most popular AMS level of 1 in the youngest group is likely to pull for denial. Level 1 is an 
affect event that colors everything, goes on forever, and is unmoored to individuals or any sense 
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of reason. It is imaginable that to contain such an overwhelming affective reality, a similarly 
powerful, reality-bending defense such as denial is in order to maintain equilibrium.  
 Contrary to earlier expectations, yet in alignment with other results regarding projection, 
there was no relationship between affect and projection. Similarly, ancillary analyses that broke 
the participants into three groups based on age did not display any significant differences. In fact, 
as noted above, projection use stayed very consistent at approximately one third of defense 
responses across groups. A similar finding was seen in the consistent proportional use of level 2 
on the AMS across these same three groups (from youngest to oldest: .406, .332 and .309). This 
similarity of all three age groups using projection and level 2 on the AMS approximately one 
third of the time warrants an exploration of the theoretical similarities between the two. 
Projection, akin to a level 2 on the AMS, requires a rudimentary ability to differentiate between 
the self and other, but also represents a confusion between self and other, with the understanding 
of the other being colored by the individual’s experience. Both are representative of a 
preoperational level of cognitive development, which is partially defined by egocentric and 
concrete thinking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). 
 As predicted, a significant, strong, positive correlation emerged between AMS level and 
use of identification. Ancillary analyses provide additional information about identification and 
the more advanced levels of 3 and 4 on the AMS. Identification and advanced levels of the AMS 
both represent similar cognitive abilities such as increasing differentiation between self and other 
stable enough to allow the integration of the other into the self as well as seeing affect as a 
psychological and internal event that can be influenced by the individual. However, both are 
limited in their representations of the other as a specific individual, for they are seen primarily 
through their gender, occupation or additional roles they play. Uniquely, identification use 
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differs significantly among all three age groups, suggesting that it is representative of an 
important developmental shift. Similarly, use of level 3 on the AMS, the first level that sees 
affect as psychological, is significantly different between the youngest and oldest groups. Taken 
together, the strong relationship between affect maturity and identification suggests that they 
move together due to increasing cognitive and object relational complexity. 
Clinical Implications 
 This study’s finding that age and affect maturity are significantly and negatively 
correlated is an important one in beginning to provide evidence for a developmental line of 
maturing affect that previously had been largely theoretical (A. A. Freud, 1965; Thompson, 
1985; Thompson, 1986). With the caveat that this sample is a clinical one, these findings can 
begin to inform clinicians who work with children of what levels of affect maturity should be 
expected at certain points in development. Knowing that there is possible developmental 
meaning to the levels of the AMS, clinicians can incorporate the knowledge of different levels of 
affect maturity into their assessment of the child’s current developmental presentation. The AMS 
can also assist the clinician in understanding the child’s experience of affect and how this may 
color their object relational schemas, social interactions, behavior and inner life.  
 While many prior studies (Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 2009a; Cramer, 2007) have examined 
the developmental course of the defense, this study adds to that body of research through 
representing a clinical sample.  As with understanding the development of affect maturity, 
having expectations for what to expect in terms of defense use within a clinical population can 
help to inform treatment. Overall, the results of this study show similar shifts in defense use 
dependent on age to prior studies, but the use of denial and projection are used more frequently 
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across age groups and identification does not dominate proportionally in adolescence as would 
be expected in a nonclinical sample.  
 Studies, such as the ones described below, suggest that overuse of age inappropriate 
defenses, such as denial, lead to problematic outcomes, while use of developmentally appropriate 
defenses at the expected ages lead to more positive mental health outcomes in adulthood. For 
example, male children who use denial at higher levels in childhood due to stressors are more 
likely to overuse denial and have lower ego maturity in young adulthood as well as being more 
likely to display maladaptive narcissism (Cramer & Block, 1998; Cramer, 2011). Similarly, 
overuse of denial during adolescence is associated with “ego undercontrol”, rather, the inability 
to modulate the expression of emotion and behavior, difficulties in delaying gratification and 
being unable to reflect on how their actions influence themselves and those around them 
(Cramer, 2009b). In contrast, it has been shown that increased use of developmentally 
appropriate defenses, in this case projection in a group of 10-13 year olds, after a traumatic event 
is associated with reduced stress and emotional upset (Dollinger & Cramer, 1990). Similarly, 
higher use of identification in adolescence, is predictive of higher self-esteem, higher sense of 
competence and overall psychological health in adulthood (Cramer & Tracy, 2005; Cramer, 
2008)  
 With this study’s findings suggesting an important developmental link between maturing 
affect and defense in children and adolescents, along with the knowledge that defensive 
processes by their definition are unconscious and that immature defense use can lead to 
problematic outcomes in adolescence and adulthood, behavioral interventions that are common 
in treating children and adolescents would not be particularly effective if they operate only at the 
conscious, rational level. Play therapy on the other hand creates a space in which both the 
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internal unconscious world and the external world can meet safely and communicate. In this 
process, fantasy and reality that might pull for a child to utilize denial can be explored and 
carefully examined, bringing the defensive process into consciousness, thus making it less 
effective and making room for more adaptive defensive processes.  
Limitations of the Study 
 A number of limitations are present in this study. This study primarily involved 
correlational analyses that cannot definitively speak to the causation for the significant 
relationships found herein. While studies using the DMM have shown internal consistency for its 
method as well as validity and reliability (Cramer, 1983; Cramer, 1987; Cramer, 1997; Cramer, 
2007; Porcerelli et al., 1998), there has been far less research utilizing Anne Thompson’s AMS 
(Thompson, 1981). One issue that was reported by the AMS coders was that there was 
sometimes only a very slight linguistic difference in deciding between level 2 and level 3 on the 
AMS (“He is sad.”; "He feels sad.”). This difference is a vital one, for it marks the shift into 
seeing affect as a psychological state. While the coders were trained extensively in the DMM and 
AMS, and were shown to be reliable with one another and blind to demographic information, it 
is possible that knowledge of the study’s hypotheses influenced their scoring. In addition, the 
collection of race/ethnicity data was incomplete and therefore was not explored or controlled for. 
Similarly, the binary method of gender identification did not allow for the reporting of gender 
identities outside of male and female. Lastly, not using information about non-verbal or other 
forms of intelligence is a major limitation since the theoretical basis for this study puts an 
emphasis on cognitive development and maturity and the analyzed material is language based. 
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Future Directions and Conclusion 
 
 The findings of this study only begin to illuminate the relationships between affect and 
defense and suggest a number of questions that could be explored in the future. This is especially 
true as this study continues to add new child and adolescent participants as well as developing 
follow-up assessments for current participants after 6 months of treatment and again at 12 
months. In addition, TATs are only one part of a larger data collection that includes parental and 
child self-reports, additional projective tests and a test of non-verbal intelligence. The follow-up 
data could potentially make longitudinal studies possible as well as further exploration of 
variables that could be related to affect and defense.  
 Since the participant data were collected during the consultation process, it would be 
hugely valuable from a number of perspectives to administer the TAT to participants who had 
remained in treatment for a certain period of time (e.g., 2 years) and compare their affect and 
defense maturity to their initial performance. Not only would this provide longitudinal data about 
developing affect and defense in children and adolescents, but it would also provide information 
about the influence of psychological treatment upon affect and defense over time. Findings could 
be compared to prior longitudinal studies of non-clinical samples, not only to compare 
developmental changes over time, but also to see if after a course of treatment, the difference 
between clinical and non-clinical samples lessened in terms of defense proportions. Examining 
the shift in affect and defense for particular patterns could also prove fruitful. For example, one 
could examine if the proportional dominance of more advanced defenses allowed participants to 
have more thoughtful and nuanced affective understanding as seen in their use of higher levels of 
affect maturity.  
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 Taking into account the additional data that are available for these participants a number 
of other areas of exploration are possible. For example, the parental and child self-report 
measures could provide information about past and current symptomatology and history of 
trauma to help inform and expand the understanding of this study’s current findings. 
Specifically, to explore this sample’s depressed performance in comparison to studies that 
looked at non-clinical samples or what types of symptoms are associated with different levels of 
affect or defense at different ages.  One question could be to compare the participants who were 
using developmentally appropriate defenses to those who are not in terms of presenting 
symptoms. In addition, since object relations and cognitive maturity were central to the 
theoretical underpinnings of this study, an analysis of the participants’ cognitive performance 
and object relations could provide important information about the assumptions underlying the 
correlation between affect and defense. This data would be particularly salient in a study that 
examined more closely the similarities this study has speculated between certain AMS levels and 
defenses. Lastly, the coders who worked with the AMS described finding themselves caught 
between level 2 and level 3 frequently and the possibility of adding a level between 2 and 3 was 
discussed.  Adding an additional level to the AMS was outside of the focus of this study, but a 
future analysis of the same TATs utilizing an AMS level 2.5 in comparison to this study’s AMS 
scores could prove helpful in making the scale more appropriate to use with children. 
 A gap seems to exist at times between the psychodynamic and psychoanalytic theories 
that shape and inform clinical work and their ability to be examined empirically.  These theories 
are complex, messy and malleable, making them adept in addressing the messy complexity of 
individuals’ psychology, but less so in attending to the needs of an empirical investigation.  This 
difficulty only increases when it comes to studies of children, who pose their own unique 
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challenges in clinical research. As with lower levels of affect maturity or the use of denial, it 
takes much less ‘work’ to operationalize and quantify aspects of psychology that are less messy 
(e.g., behavioral symptoms) and to paint with a broad brush that avoids individual complexity 
and histories.  The AMS and the DMM were chosen for this study because they have taken on 
the courageous task of operationalizing and quantifying the theoretical complexity seen in 
psychodynamic and developmental perspectives.   
 The initial motivation for this dissertation was to find a question that would add depth to 
my understanding of children and inform my clinical work with them.  Coming from a 
perspective clinically that a developmental understanding is vital to working with and assessing 
children, I was drawn to areas of development that are meaningful in how children interact with 
and manage their world.  The effectiveness and appropriateness of the defenses children use, as 
well as their understanding of emotions, both their own and others, are essential elements of how 
children experience the world around them.   
 This study begins an empirical exploration of the relationship between affect and defense 
by providing evidence that the maturity of both affect and defense are significantly related and 
that both are individually related to maturational development.  These findings are exciting in 
that they are consistent with central assumptions made theoretically regarding affect and defense, 
but also that both these variables represent meaningful developmental shifts between particular 
age groups. In addition, the results of this study lend support to the AMS as a meaningful 
measure and adds to the DMM literature in showing that directional patterns for defense 
development are similar to a non-clinical sample, but depressed in terms of expected rate of 
increasing proportions of mature defense. 
 	
69 
References 
Arsenio, W. F., & Kramer, R. (1992). Victimizers and their victims: Children's conceptions of the mixed 
emotional consequences of moral transgressions. Child Development, 63(4), 915-927.  
Brentano, F. (2012/1874). Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Routledge. 
Brody, L. R., Rozek, M. K., & Muten, E. O. (1985). Age, sex, and individual differences in children's 
defensive styles. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 14(2), 132-138.  
Camras, L. A., & Shuster, M. M. (2013). Current emotion research in developmental psychology. 
Emotion Review, 5(3), 321-329.  
Chandler, M. J., Paget, K. F., & Koch, D. A. (1978). The child's demystification of psychological defense 
mechanisms: A structural and developmental analysis. Developmental Psychology, 14(3), 197.  
Cooper, S. H. (1998). Changing notions of defense within psychoanalytic theory. Journal of Personality, 
66(6), 947-964.  
Cramer, P. (1996). Storytelling, narrative and the thematic apperception. Test.New York: Guilford,  
Cramer, P. (1983). Children's use of defense mechanisms in reaction to displeasure caused by others. 
Journal of Personality, 51(1), 78-94.  
Cramer, P. (1987). The development of defense mechanisms. Journal of Personality, 55(4), 597-614.  
Cramer, P. (1991). The development of defense mechanisms: Theory, research, and assessment. Springer-
Verlag Publishing. 
Cramer, P. (1997). Evidence for change in children's use of defense mechanisms. Journal of Personality, 
65(2), 233-247.  
Cramer, P. (1999a). Ego functions and ego development: Defense mechanisms and intelligence as 
predictors of ego level. Journal of Personality, 67(5), 735-760.  
 	
70 
Cramer, P. (1999b). Personality, personality disorders, and defense mechanisms. Journal of Personality, 
67(3), 535-554.  
Cramer, P. (2006). Protecting the self: Defense mechanisms in action (1st ed.). New York, London: The 
Guilford Press. 
Cramer, P. (2008). Identification and the development of competence: A 44-year longitudinal study from 
late adolescence to late middle age. Psychology and Aging, 23(2), 410.  
Cramer, P. (2009a). The development of defense mechanisms from pre-adolescence to early adulthood: 
Do IQ and social class matter? A longitudinal study. Journal of Research in Personality, 43(3), 464-
471.  
Cramer, P. (2009b). An increase in early adolescent undercontrol is associated with the use of denial. 
Journal of Personality Assessment, 91(4), 331-339.  
Cramer, P. (2011). Young adult narcissism: A 20 year longitudinal study of the contribution of parenting 
styles, preschool precursors of narcissism, and denial. Journal of Research in Personality, 45(1), 19-
28.  
Cramer, P., & Block, J. (1998). Preschool antecedents of defense mechanism use in young adults: A 
longitudinal study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 159.  
Cramer, P., & Brilliant, M. A. (2001). Defense use and defense understanding in children. Journal of 
Personality, 69(2), 297-322.  
Cramer, P., & Gaul, R. (1988). The effects of success and failure on children's use of defense 
mechanisms. Journal of Personality, 56(4), 729-742.  
Cramer, P., & Tracy, A. (2005). The pathway from child personality to adult adjustment: The road is not 
straight. Journal of Research in Personality, 39(3), 369-394.  
 	
71 
Cramer, P. (2007). Longitudinal study of defense mechanisms: Late childhood to late adolescence. 
Journal of Personality, 75(1), 1-24.  
Diehl, M., Coyle, N., & Labouvie-Vief, G. (1996). Age and sex differences in strategies of coping and 
defense across the life span. Psychology and Aging, 11(1), 127.  
Dollinger, S. J., & Cramer, P. (1990). Children's defensive responses and emotional upset following a 
disaster: A projective assessment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 54(1-2), 116-127.  
Dollinger, S. J., & McGuire, B. (1981). The development of psychological-mindedness: Children's 
understanding of defense mechanisms. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 10, 117-121.  
Fast, I., Erard, R. E., Fitzpatrick, C. J., Thompson, A. E., & Young, L. (1985). Event theory: A Piaget-
Freud integration. New York and London: Routledge. 
Finzi, R., Har-Even, D., & Weizman, A. (2003). Comparison of ego defenses among physically abused 
children, neglected, and non-maltreated children. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 44(5), 388-395.  
Freud, A. (1946). The ego and the mechanisms of defense. New York: International Universities Press. 
Freud, A. (1965). Normality and pathology in childhood: Assessments of development (the writings of 
Anna Freud: Vol. 6) New York: International Universities Press. 
Freud, S. (1894/1962). The neuro-psychoses of defence. in the standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud, volume III (1893-1899): Early psycho-analytic 
publications (pp. 41-61). London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (1922/2003). Beyond the pleasure principle. UK: Penguin. 
Freud, S. (1936/1926). Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 5, 1-28.  
Freud, S. (1958). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning (1911): Standard edition, vol. 
12. London: Hogarth Press. 
 	
72 
Goudsmit, N. (2010). Affect maturity in a sample of children with language and attention 
symptomatology. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Graduate Center, City University of New 
York, New York, NY. 
Hering, A. M. (1987). Alexithymia: A developmental view using a differentiation model of affect maturity. 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Michigan, Michigan. 
Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 
27(Pt 3-4), 99-110.  
Laor, N., Wolmer, L., & Cohen, D. J. (2001). Mothers’ functioning and children’s symptoms 5 years after 
a SCUD missile attack. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158(7), 1020-1026.  
Loewenstein, R. M. (1967). Defensive organization and autonomous ego functions . Journal of the 
American Psychoanalytic Association, 15, 795-809.  
Mahler, M. S., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975). The psychological birth of the infant. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Morgan, C. D., & Murray, H. A. (1935). A method for investigating fantasies: The thematic apperception 
test. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 34(2), 289-306.  
Murray, H. A. (1943). Thematic apperception test. 
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the child. New York: Basic Books. 
Poikolainen, K., Kanerva, R., & Lönnqvist, J. (1995). Social class and defense styles among adolescents. 
Journal of Adolescence, 18(6), 669-677.  
Porcerelli, J. H., Thomas, S., Hibbard, S., & Cogan, R. (1998). Defense mechanisms development in 
children, adolescents, and late adolescents. Journal of Personality Assessment, 71(3), 411-420.  
Rapaport, D. (1967). Collected papers. New York: Basic Books. 
 	
73 
Rapaport, D., Schafer, R., & Gill, M. M. (1946). Diagnostic psychological testing: The theory, statistical 
evaluation, and diagnostic application of a battery of tests. New York: Year Book Publishers, Inc. 
Raven, J. C. (1965). Guide to using the coloured progressive matrices: Sets A, ab, B. London: H. K. 
Lewis & Co. 
Rorschach, H. (1942). In Oberholzer E. (Ed.), Psychodiagnostics: A diagnostic test based on perception. 
New York: Grune and Stratton. 
Sandstrom, M. J., & Cramer, P. (2003). Girls' use of defense mechanisms following peer rejection. 
Journal of Personality, 71(4), 605-627.  
Schafer, R. (1958). How was this story told? Journal of Projective Techniques, 22(2), 181-210.  
Shaw, R. J., Ryst, E., & Steiner, H. (1996). Temperament as a correlate of adolescent defences 
mechanisms. Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 27(2), 105-114.  
Silverman, L. (1999). Defense and adaptation in uninfected "affected" siblings of HIV positive children. 
(Unpublished Doctoral). The City University of New York, New York. 
Slade, A., Aber, J., Berger, B., Bresgi, I., & Kaplan, M. (2003). PDI-R2-S parent development interview 
revised short version. New York: The City College of New York., . 
Spitz, R. A. (1961). Some early prototypes of ego defenses. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 9, 626-651.  
Strayer, J. (1986). Children's attributions regarding the situational determinants of emotion in self and 
others. Developmental Psychology, 22(5), 649.  
Tallandini, M. A., & Caudek, C. (2010). Defense mechanisms development in typical children. 
Psychotherapy Research, 20(5), 535-545.  
 	
74 
Thompson, A. E. (1981). A theory of affect development and maturity: Applications to the thematic 
apperception test. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan, Michigan. 
Thompson, A. E. (1985). The nature of emotion and its development. In I. Fast (Ed.), Event theory: A 
Piaget-Freud integration (pp. 151-173) Routledge. 
Thompson, A. E. (1986). An object relational theory of affect maturity: Applications to the thematic 
apperception test. In M. Kissen (Ed.), Assessing object relations phenomena. (pp. 207-224). 
Madison: International Universities Press. 
Tuber, S. (2012). Understanding personality through projective testing. New York: Jason Aronson. 
Vaillant, G. E. (1977). Adaptation to life. Boston: Harvard University Press. 
Vaillant, G. E. (1992). Ego mechanisms of defense: A guide for clinicians and researchers. American 
Psychiatric Publications. 
Vaillant, G. E. (1995). The wisdom of the ego. Boston: Harvard University Press. 
Vaillant, G. E., & Vaillant, C. (1992). Empirical evidence that defensive styles are independent of 
environmental influence. Ego Mechanisms of Defense: A Guide for Clinicians and Researchers, , 
105-126.  
Vaillant, G. E., Bond, M., & Vaillant, C. O. (1986). An empirically validated hierarchy of defense 
mechanisms. Archives of General Psychiatry, 43(8), 786-794.  
Whiteman, M. (1967). Children's conceptions of psychological causality. Child Development, , 143-155.  
Whiteman, M. (1970). The development of conceptions of psychological causality. Cognitive Studies, 1, 
339-361.  
Winnicott, D. W. (1945). Primitive emotional development. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis,  
 	
75 
Winnicott, D. W. (1965). In Khan M. (Ed.), The maturational processes and the facilitating environment: 
Studies in the theory of emotional development Hogarth Press London. 
World Health Organization. (2002). Gender and mental health. 
 
 
 
 
